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WHITHER THIBOUTOT? SECTION 1983, PRIVATE
ENFORCEMENT, AND THE DAMAGES DILEMMA
George D. Brown*
If a statute is to be amended after it has been authoritatively construed
by this Court, that task should almost always be performed by Congress.Justice John Paul Stevens**
The Supreme Court's decision in Maine v. Thiboutot' appeared to signal
a major breakthrough for plaintiffs seeking private enforcement of federal
statutory law. 2 The Court held that the reference to "laws" in section 1983
of Title 42 of the United States Code3 encompassed all federal statutes, not
merely those protecting civil rights.' For plaintiffs suing defendants who had
acted "under color of state law," Thiboutot promised three significant advantages: avoidance of a right of action hurdle at a time when the Supreme
Court's approach to inferring private rights to sue under federal statutes
was taking a restrictive turn;5 the availability of attorney's fees if they
prevailed;6 and, potentially, damages.7 The area in which Thiboutot seemed
* Professor of Law, Boston College. A.B., 1961, LL.B.,

1965, Harvard University.

** Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 3221, 3253 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
1. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
2. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 75, 230-31 (1980).
3. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United State' or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to be deprived of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 'action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981).
4. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4. Although the precise issue before the Court was the availability
of attorney's fees, such an award could only be made if the plaintiffs had sued under § 1983.
Thus, the construction of the term "laws" in § 1983 is not dictum.
5. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (Court
refused to infer private right of action under the statute). Transamericaexemplifies the more
restrictive approach which has emerged since Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Cort could
be read as consistent with the federal common law approach of earlier cases such as J.l. Case
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). The more recent cases, however, treat the issue of implication of rights of action as a matter of statutory construction, in which. legislative intent is
paramount. See Brown, Of Activism and Erie-The Implication Doctrine's Implicationsfor the
Nature and Role of the Federal Courts, 69 IOWA L. REV. 617 (1984); see also Frankel, Implied
Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553 (1981).
6. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. V 1981), attorney's fees are awarded to the prevailing
party. See, e.g., Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980) (awarding attorney's fees in action based
on Social Security Act violations).
7. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981), any person who has violated another's federal
constitutional rights "shall be liable." This seems to be a clear reference to a damages remedy.

DEPAUL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 33:31

destined to have the greatest impact was that of federal grant programs under
which states and localities receive federal funding.' Third-party enforcement
of such programs, already a burgeoning area of litigation, 9 apparently was
due for an explosion.
Yet within a year of this landmark decision, there were strong signs,
ominous to some,'" that the Supreme Court, having given with one hand,
would take away with the other." Dicta in Pennhurst State School and
Hospital v. Halderman,"2 and the holding in Middlesex County Sewerage
Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association 3 indicated that with respect
to the fundamental issue of the existence of a cause of action, recourse to
section 1983 could be precluded by the existence of an alternative enforcement scheme. Any such exception might leave the section 1983 plaintiff only
slightly better off than a litigant asking a court to infer a right to sue from
a federal statute. Indeed, the two cases can be read for the proposition that
the same analysis is to be applied to claims of an implied right as to claims
of an express right under section 1983.' ' Further ground for such suspicion
is the fact that the authors of the two opinions, Justices Powell and Rehnquist, seemed to go out of their way to reach the section 1983 issue.' 5 Both
had dissented in Thiboutot itself,' 6 and both appear to have reservations
about private enforcement of federal law generally. 7
Since 1981, the Supreme Court has offered little guidance as to the status
and continuing vitality of Thiboutot.'" The Court's recent decision in Guard8. See The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, supra note 2, at 227-28; see also Thiboutot, 448
U.S. at 34-37 (Powell, J., dissenting). There are three general types of federal grants: categorical
grants, block grants and revenue sharing. Categorical grants limit the use of funds to specified
activities. Block grants define a broader subject matter within which the grantee may exercise
considerable discretion in allocating the funds. Revenue sharing places few restrictions on the
use of the funds, thereby maximizing grantee discretion. See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CATEGORICAL GRANTS: THEIR ROLE AND DESIGN 5-9 (1977).

Federal

grants to states and localities totalled $94.7 billion in fiscal year 1981, as compared with $10
billion in 1960. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, 1984, at 4-16 (1983).
9. See R. CAPPALLI, FEDERAL GRANTS AND COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS § 8:37 (1982).
10. See, e.g., Wartelle and Louden, Private Enforcement of Federal Statutes: The Role
of the Section 1983 Remedy, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487, 489 (1982).
11.Municipal Liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983: Hearings before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 405 (1981) (statement
of Prof. Leon Friedman) [hereinafter cited as Municipal Liability Hearings].
12. 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981).
13. 453 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1981).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 77-108 and accompanying text.
15. For example, in Sea Clammers, the parties never raised the issue of the availability
of a § 1983 right of action.
16. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 11 (Powell, J., dissenting).
17. See, e.g., Howard, The States and the Supreme Court, 31 CATH. U.L. REV. 375, 424
(1982).

18. See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 103 S.Ct. 3221, 3226 n.3 (1983)
(Powell, J., concurring). In Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433 (1981), a 1981 case decided prior
to Pennhurst and Sea Clammers, the Court reaffirmed its Thiboutot construction of § 1983.
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ians Association v. Civil Service Commission,I9 however, makes further inroads on Thiboutot by curtailing, if not eliminating, damages as a remedy
for violation of federal grant conditions.20 It has been left to the lower courts
to harmonize the Thiboutot-Pennhurst-SeaClammers triad. The result has
been a crazy quilt of inconsistent decisions in which one can find support
for virtually any proposition about statutory claims under section 1983. Particularly vexatious for the lower courts have been cases in which the plaintiff asserts an express right of action based on section 1983 while
simultaneously asking the court to recognize an implied right of action from
the underlying statute. Some courts read Pennhurst and Sea Clammers as
essentially merging the analyses. 2' Other courts read Thiboutot as creating
a presumption that permits a plaintiff to enforce a statute via section 1983
in cases in which an attempt to infer a right to sue under that statute would
be unsuccessful.2 2 Such an analysis treats the express section 1983 right of
action as hierarchically superior, or preferred, vis-a-vis an implied right. 3
A surprising number of courts have reached the diametrically opposite result,
holding that the availability of an implied right of action operates to preclude
section 1983.24 In sum, it seems fair to say that the state of the law in this
area is anything but settled. It is clear, however, that what some hailed as
"the promise of Thiboutot"" has been sharply curtailed.
Whatever its status in the courts may be, Thiboutot is alive and well in
the law reviews. A band of defenders has leapt into the fray.2 6 Much of
19. 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983).
20. Id. at 3232 n.23.
21. See, e.g., Polchowski v. Gorris, 714 F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1983); Uniformed Firefighters
Ass'n Local 94 v. City of New York, 676 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1982); Members, Bridgeport Hous.
Auth. Police v. City of Bridgeport, 564 F. Supp. 2 (D. Conn. 1982); Moxley v. Vernot, 555
F. Supp. 554 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
22. See, e.g., Boatowners and Tenants Ass'n v. Port of Seattle, 716 F.2d 669 (9th Cir.
1983) (dictum); Balf Co. v. Gaitor, 534 F. Supp. 600 (D. Conn. 1982); Ryans v. New Jersey
Comm'n for the Blind and Visually Impaired, 542 F. Supp. 841 (D.N.J. 1982); cf. Rollison
v. Biggs, 567 F. Supp. 964, 971 n.11 (D. Del. 1983). For a discussion of these cases, see infra
note 138.
23. Note, Implied Private Rights of Action and Section 1983: CongressionalIntent Through
a Glass Darkly, 23 B.C.L. REV. 1439, 1456 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Implied Rights
and Section 1983].
24. See, e.g., Longoria v. Harris, 554 F. Supp. 102 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Flavin v. Connecticut
State Bd. of Educ., 553 F. Supp. 827 (D. Conn. 1982); Manecke v. School Bd., 553 F. Supp.
787 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Ruth Anne M. v. Alvin Indep. School Dist., 532 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.
Tex. 1982); Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171 (D.N.H. 1981).
25. The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, supra note 2, at 230.
26. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U. CHI. L.
REV. 394 (1982); Wartelle and Louden, supra note 10; Note, Implied Rights and Section 1983,
supra note 23; Note, Preclusion of Section 1983 Causes of Action by Comprehensive Statutory
Remedial Schemes, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1183 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Preclusion of
Section 1983]; see also Note, The Section 1983 Remedy and Purely Statutory Federal Rights:
Ryans v. New Jersey Commission for the Blind and Visually Impaired, 1983 B.Y.U. L. REV.
465 [hereinafter cited as Note, The Section 1983 Remedy]. It should be noted that the
author of Note, The Section 1983 Remedy, appears somewhat ambivalent towards Thiboutot.
See Note, The Section 1983 Remedy, supra, at 481-82.
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the writing has a good guy-bad guy theme: the regressive wing of the Supreme
Court is out to eviscerate one of the liberal wing's greatest triumphs.27
Thiboutot's defenders, however, face a major problem. No one contends
that the decision means literally what it says-that section 1983 authorizes
private enforcement of all federal statutes. In some cases, section 1983 actions would undercut the goals of the Congress which enacted the underlying statute sought to be enforced. The admitted problem of identifying those
cases elicits a two-part response. The first part is easy: after Thiboutot there
is a presumption that section 1983 is available. The second part is not so
easy: a principled and workable approach must be developed to determine
when the presumption is rebutted.
This article examines and evaluates the attempts by courts and commentators to work with, and reconcile, the Thiboutot-Pennhurst-Sea Clammers
triad. The analysis focuses on litigation under federal grant programs, the
area which has generated most of the cases in which Thiboutot problems
arise and the area which presents the most difficult questions of the limits
of federal power. An immediate conclusion is that the way in which one
approaches the reconciliation of these precedents depends greatly on whether
or not one thinks Thiboutot was correctly decided. Thus, at the risk of retracing old ground, Section I of the article begins with a reexamination of
Thiboutot and an analysis of the weaknesses of the Court's opinion. Section II considers Whether Pennhurst and Sea Clammers should be read as
necessary limitations on Thiboutot or whether they virtually eviscerate that
decision. Section III examines in detail the various attempts by lower courts
to harmonize the triad.
As noted, those who do accept Thiboutot are forced to develop a
framework for determining when a section 1983 action is unavailable. The
difficulties inherent in any such inquiry are compounded by the fact that
neither the Congress that enacted section 1983 nor, in most cases, the Congress that enacted the underlying statute was aware of the problem of reconciling alternative enforcement mechanisms. Accordingly, Section IV of this
article examines the various rebuttal mechanisms proffered and concludes
that each has serious flaws.
Section V then turns to the question of how those who, like the author,
think Thiboutot was wrongly decided, might find in the subsequent cases
eroding principles to mitigate the impact of its holding. One approach is
to treat Pennhurst and Sea Clammers as merging the section 1983 and implied right inquiries, thus depriving Thiboutot of much of its force. 2"
Although the arguments in favor of such a merger are appealing, it poses
problems of authority. Initially, there is the question of the lower courts
ability to treat a major recent Supreme Court precedent as overruled sub
silentio. Far more serious is the question of any court's authority to read
27. See, e.g., Wartelle and Louden, supra note 10; Note, Implied Rights and Section 1983,
supra note 23.
28. See infra notes 220-31 and accompanying text.
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the words "and laws" out of section 1983. After analyzing these questions,
the article recommends reconsideration and adoption of the position taken
by Justice Powell in his Thiboutot dissent: private enforcement of federal
statutes under section 1983 should be limited to laws that protect equal rights
as that term has traditionally been understood. This reading gives force to
section 1983, avoids the potentially devastating impacts of Thiboutot on
federal grant programs,29 and leaves the question of private enforcement
primarily in the hands of the Congress that enacts the underlying statute,
where it ought to be."
Whatever approach is taken to private enforcement under section 1983,
there remains the difficult, and increasingly litigated question of whether
courts may award damages for improper administration of federal grant
programs. 3' Section 1983 specifically provides that anyone who violates
federally secured rights "shall be liable" to the injured party. Grant disputes
are fertile ground for damage claims. 32 Yet even in the camp of defenders
of Thiboutot's plain meaning approach, there is recognition that damage
awards may be inappropriate in the context of some federal programs.33 If
one focuses on grant programs, serious issues involving what might be termed
"grant policy" emerge; damage awards may drain resources away from the
very area they were meant to aid, and the potential for unpredictable liabilities
might deter participation in grant programs. On a more fundamental level
there may be significant constitutional problems, given the Supreme Court's
insistence that there are limitations on Congress's ability to impose obligations under the spending power."' In analyzing the damages issue in Section
VI, the article devotes considerable attention to the recent case of Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission.3" Guardians appears to hold
that damages are unavailable, at least for unintentional violations of conditions attached to federal grant programs.3" In addition to its significance
29. See R. CAPPALLI, supra note 9, at § 8:47.
30. Even under Justice Powell's reading of § 1983 there would remain the problem of whether
the existence of specific enforcement provisions in the underlying statute precludes § 1983 actions. See infra notes 232-41 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1982) (private cause of action
for damages is available under Rehabilitation Act although not available under Education for
All Handicapped Children Act); Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir.
1981) (Education Amendments of 1972 do not implicitly provide damages as a remedy for
an individual wronged by conduct which violated those amendments), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
937 (1982); Drayden v. Needville Indep. School Dist., 642 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1981) (same).
32. There are more than 700 federal aid programs. Furthermore, 112,000 promissory grant
agreements are signed annually. The standards to implement these programs and grants can
be used to evaluate the legality of a state or local official's conduct. Thus, numerous possibilities
for damage claims are available. See Cappalli, Federal Grants and the New Statutory Tort:
State and Local Officials Beware!, 12 URB. LAW. 445, 446 (1980).
33. See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 436 n.157. Professor Sunstein does not appear to address grant programs specifically in making this suggestion.
34. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17 n.13.
35. 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983).
36. Id. at 3235.
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as the first Supreme Court case directly addressing grants and damages,
Guardians is noteworthy for its heavy reliance on Pennhurst. As developed
below, 37 Guardians transposes a mode of analysis utilized in Pennhurst to
determine the existence of federal rights, into an analysis to determine the
nature and extent of remedies. The implications for section 1983 litigation
are far-reaching, indeed.
The article ends, in Section VII, with an inquiry into whether Congress
should act to clarify the availability of section 1983. Congress might well
pass legislation changing the "and laws" language to something such as "and
by any law providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States."'" Such an amendment would overturn Thiboutot and, in theory, end the confusion that the case has generated.
There are, however, major political obstacles in the way of any legislative
proposal perceived as cutting back on civil rights. Moreover, the amendment might create uncertainties of its own, such as the availability of any
right of action to bring the traditional welfare case. Perhaps the best argument against such an across-the-board statute is the fact that the courts
themselves have already acted to minimize problems created by Thiboutot.
Accepting this argument does not mean that the basic decision about private
enforcement of complex modern day federal laws ought to lie either with
the courts or with the Congress that enacted section 1983. Current and future
Congresses should address the issue directly. Grant programs, for example,
are usually authorized for periods of several years. During reauthorization,
or any other period of reexamination, the desirability of private enforcement ought to be considered. The down side of this approach is that in
the interim the lower courts will have to continue to struggle with Thiboutot
unless, of course, the Supreme Court overrules it.
I.

THIBOUTOT-RIGHT OR WRONG?

One reason for Thiboutot's uncertain status as a precedent may be the
decidedly slipshod quality of the opinion itself. Even defenders of the result
agree that Justice Brennan could, and should, have argued the case for a
broad reaching of "and laws" far more persuasively than he did. 39 Given
the importance of the issue and the magnitude of his decision, it is surprising that Justice Brennan authored a rather casual opinion which treated the
matter as easily resolved.'
Thiboutot began as a challenge to Maine's administration of a federally
funded welfare program." The plaintiffs secured a judgment in their favor

37. See infra notes 242-91 and accompanying text.
38. See S. 584, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in Municipal Liability Hearings,
supra note 11, at 3.
39. See, e.g., Wartelle and Louden, supra note 10, at 515.
40. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 12 (Powell, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 2-3.
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on the ground that the state was violating the applicable federal statute. 2
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether they were entitled to an
award under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.' 3 That
statute authorizes fee awards in specified classes of cases, including any action or proceeding to enforce section 1983. Thus, the Court had to decide
whether the original welfare challenge could be characterized as a section
1983 suit. Resolution of this issue turned on whether section 1983's reference
to "laws" embraces all federal statutes that create rights, privileges, or immunities, or whether it should be limited to laws protecting civil or equal
rights. The majority opted for the broader meaning."
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, placed primary emphasis on
"the plain language" of the statute." 5 He noted that Congress had not
qualified the phrase "and laws," and he stated the question before the Court
as whether "the phrase 'and laws' . . . means what it says, or whether it
should be limited to some subset of laws."4 6 Justice Powell, however, in
his dissenting opinion, was on solid ground when emphasizing that even in
the context of Reconstruction era legislation, plain meaning is "too simplistic
a guide to the construction of § 1983." 47 A good example of the Court's
rejection of a plain meaning approach is the doctrine of immunity for state
and local officials sued under section 1983. The doctrine began in Tenney
v. Brandhove,"8 which involved state legislators and has been extended to
judicial and quasi-judicial officials. 9 Most recently, the doctrine has been
applied to police officers who have testified in judicial proceedings." In all
these cases, the defendants were within the literal language of section 1983,
but the Court declared itself bound to consider "the role played by history
and policy in determining whether § 1983 incorporates a particular common
law immunity." 5"
Apart from the plain meaning approach, Justice Brennan buttressed his
analysis by referring to precedent. The Court, in Edelman v. Jordan,52 had
interpreted Rosado v. Wyman 3 as holding that "suits in federal court under
§ 1983 are proper to secure compliance with the provisions of the Social

42. Id. at 3.
43. Id. at 4.
44. Id. at 6-8.
45. Id. at 4.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 14 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist. Based on legislative history and a concern for federal intrusion into
state and local affairs, Justice Powell would have limited "and laws" to those protecting civil
or equal rights. Id. at 11 (Powell J., dissenting).

48. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
49. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
50. Briscoe v. Lahue, 103 S. Ct. 1108 (1983).
51. Id. at 1133 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

52. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
53. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
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Security Act on the part of participating States." 5 The precedential support, however, was not as clear as Justice Brennan suggested. On the same
day it delivered the Edelman dictum, the Court in Hagans v. Lavine" left
open the question of the source of a welfare plaintiff's cause of action. Certainly the lower courts were divided over the availability of section 1983
to enforce statutory claims.56 It also should be noted that many lower courts
and, presumably, litigants were simply unaware of any such possibility. In
fact, the years immediately preceding Thiboutot witnessed an extensive body
of cases in which third parties sought to enforce federal grant conditions
through rights of action implied from the grant statutes themselves." If what
Justice Brennan terms as the Court's "many pronouncements on the scope
of § 1983"" were as clear as he said, it is hard to understand why so few
courts got the message.
In arriving at his broad construction of "and laws," Justice Brennan chose
not to rely on the legislative history of section 1983. Describing this history
as "scanty," he stated that "[o]ne conclusion which emerges clearly is that
the legislative history does not permit a definitive answer. '"59' To some extent, this reluctance to rely on legislative history is understandable. Those
members of the Court who have undertaken the inquiry have reached sharply
differing conclusions. 6" The confusion stems from the fact that section 1983's
predecessor provided jurisdiction and a remedy for the deprivation of constitutional rights. 6 The 1874 revision split the jurisdictional and remedial
provisions,6" and the words "and laws" were added to what is now section
1983.63 The district courts' jurisdiction extended to claims involving constitutional and statutory rights, while that of the circuit courts was limited to
constitutional claims and claims to vindicate "any right secured by any law
providing for equal rights." 6 ' Justice Powell has argued that Congress was
concerned only with "federal legislation providing specifically for equality
of rights .. ."65 On the other hand, the generalized reference to "laws"
certainly will bear a broader meaning.
54. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 675.
55. 415 U.S. 528, 533 n.5 (1974).
56. See, e.g., Note, The Section 1983 Remedy, supra note 26, at 466 n.9 (citing cases with
opposing holdings on the availability of § 1983 remedy).
57. See R. CAPPALLI, supra note 9, at § 8:37.
58. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 8.
59. Id. at 7.
60. Compare Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 623 (1979) (Powell,
J., concurring) with id. at 646 (White, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 650-52 (White, J., concurring).
62. Id.at 653 (White, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 624 (Powell, J., concurring).
64. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 6-8. Section 1983 began as section 1 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871, which provided jurisdiction and a remedy for violations of the Constitution only.
A provision for statutory violations was added during the 1874 revision. The question which
the legislative history leaves unresolved is whether the reference to laws in the 1874 predecessor
of section 1983 was only a shorthand reference to civil rights laws or whether Congress knew
the difference and attached importance to it. See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 398-409.
65. 448 U.S. at 16 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Rather than simply allude to this standoff, Justice Brennan might well
have elaborated on the underlying purpose of section 1983: to provide additional protection from abuses by state and local officials when those abuses
took the form of violations of federal rights." Indeed, it is upon just such
an interpretation of the statute that Thiboutot's defenders place their primary
reliance. As one commentator states, "[Thiboutot's] extension of section 1983
to the protection of federal statutory rights, though of recent vintage, is
nevertheless consonant with the philosophy, underlying the post-Civil War
enactments, of judicial oversight and close scrutiny of the conduct of state
officials."67
A partial response is that in 1874, Congress could not have foreseen the
vastly different legal landscape created, for example, by the complex sets
of conditions and assurances in a modern federal grant program. The first
Morrill Act was a tentative step toward a federal grant system, 8 but there
were grave doubts as to how much authority over domestic matters the spending power conferred on Congress.69 Those who defend Thiboutot by arguing that there are simply more federal laws today than a century ago70 miss
the point. The federal laws which section 1983 plaintiffs today seek to enforce are so qualitatively different from those laws known to the Reconstruction Congress that it requires some stretch of the imagination to say that
what is involved are the kinds of "state violations of federal rights" 7 ' that
the drafters of section 1983 sought to remedy.
Still, the argument based on underlying statutory purpose has considerable
force. One way to counter it is to invoke policy arguments as suggested by
Justice Powell, who criticized the majority for showing "little consideration
of the consequences of its judgment." 72 Defenders of Thiboutot may attempt to prevent consideration of any such arguments on the ground that
Congress has already spoken, and that therefore a court lacks authority to
entertain policy considerations. 7 3 Such considerations should not, however,
be out of bounds, as the Court has often engaged in a highly policy oriented
construction of section 1983." 4 Moreover, it is not only the intent of the
1874 Congress that is at issue in this debate. Also to be considered are the
many Congresses which enacted the hundreds of grant and other programs
that are now subject to broad scale private enforcement under Thiboutot.
66. Id. at 5. Justice Brennan alludes to this rationale but does not utilize it as the principal

underpinning of his decision.
67. Note, Preclusion of Section 1983, supra note 26, at 1195.
68. See R. CAPPALL!, supra note 9, at § 1:20.
69. See Brown, New Federalism, Old Federalism, and the Fiscal Constitution, 68 A.B.A.
J. 946 (1982).
70. See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 409.
71. Note, Preclusion of Section 1983, supra note 26, at 1194.
72. 448 U.S. at 12 (Powell, J., dissenting).
73. See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 410.
74. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (Court relied heavily
on tort law policies concerning the fairness of allocating costs stemming from constitutional
violations by local officials).
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In the grant context, one authority has asserted that extensive litigation
could have "devastating" consequences for the operation of the grant
system.7" For example, awards of damages and/or attorney's fees may divert
public resources away from the very programmatic needs which Congress
intended to see addressed. Moreover, the prospect of being a frequent defendant on a somewhat unpredictable basis might well deter states and local
governments from participating at all in a wide range of grant programs.
Justice Powell surely is correct in stating that extensive private enforcement
of grant programs under section 1983 "creates a major new intrusion into
state sovereignty under our federal system. ' ' 6
If neither language, precedent, nor history is persuasive, and policy considerations suggest a result other than the plain meaning holding of Thiboutot,
there is much to be said for Justice Powell's position that the words "and
laws" should be limited to traditional civil rights protection. He offered a
reading which was consistent with the intent of the 1874 Congress, which
took into consideration the vast changes in the nature of federal laws on
the books today, and which largely avoided the problems of collision between section 1983 and alternative modes of enforcement of federal laws.
The majority, however, would not accept Justice Powell's position and insisted upon an unduly broad reading of the statute. Thus, some limiting
efforts such as those undertaken in Pennhurst and Sea Clammers were inevitable. The twofold question that these cases pose is what approach to
limiting Thiboutot the Court did in fact propose, and, whether the decisions
are simply faithful attempts to keep Thiboutot within reasonable bounds or
whether they amount to overruling a recent precedent sub silentio.
II.

PENNHURST AND SEA CLAMMERS-CALIBRATION

A.

OR EVISCERATION?

Pennhurst

The holding in Pennhurst did not address the ability of private plaintiffs
to enforce federally created rights, but addressed whether any such rights
in fact existed. At issue were conditions in a state-run hospital for the care
and treatment of the mentally retarded. Plaintiff residents had sought relief
from the present operation of the hospital under a number of theories based
both on federal and state law. The circuit court affirmed a judgment in
plaintiffs' favor" on the ground that the case presented a clear violation
of the "bill of rights" section of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance
and Bill of Rights Act.78 On appeal, a majority of the Supreme Court held
that this particular section of the statute was essentially precatory, and was
not enforceable as would be a specific condition of a federal grant program.
The Court reasoned that because grant conditions impose financial obliga-

75.
76.
77.
78.

See R. CAPPALLI, supra note 9, at § 8:47.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 33 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hosp., 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc).
42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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tions on states, Congress must "speak with a clear voice" to "enable the
States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of
their participation."" The bill of rights section of the Act simply did not
satisfy this stringent test for when a statute enacted under the spending clause
creates enforceable rights in third party beneficiaries.
The opinion might well have stopped there. There also was the possiblity,
however, that the plaintiffs could sue to compel compliance with those conditions that were contained in the Act. In dictum, Justice Rehnquist addressed several questions that the lower courts would have to consider in
dealing with any such suit. He first noted that plaintiffs might sue under
an implied right theory, but stated that in federal grant programs "the typical
remedy for state noncompliance with federally imposed conditions is not a
private cause of action for noncompliance but rather action by the Federal
Government to terminate funds to the state.""0 This statement is rather
remarkable because it would virtually wipe out the doctrine of implied rights
of action, at least in the context of grant cases. All grant statutes contain
a grantor remedy of the sort to which Justice Rehnquist referred. In any
event, Justice Rehnquist went on to discuss, at some length, the possible
bearing of Thiboutot on plaintiffs' ability to sue under section 1983. He
identified two exceptions to the broad Thiboutot principle: first, situations
in which the claims asserted by plaintiffs cannot be deemed "a 'right secured'
by the laws of the United States within the meaning of § 1983"; and, second, situations in which the "governing statute provides an exclusive remedy
for violations of its terms."'" This second exception seems a reasonable
qualification of Thiboutot, at least when stated in general terms. Justice Rehnquist, however, went on to suggest that the previously mentioned remedy
on the part of the grantor to terminate funds might well be exclusive, thus
precluding resort to section 1983.2 If this suggestion were taken at face value,
it would have the twofold effect of merging the section 1983 and implied
right inquiries and of making it virtually impossible for a grant plaintiff
ever to succeed on either theory.83
Justice White dissented on the merits, arguing that the obligations in the
bill of rights section of the Act were quite clear and should be enforceable."
He then addressed the issue of the availability of section 1983, as construed
in Thiboutot, to resolve any cause of action difficulties that the plaintiff
might have. He read Thiboutot as creating "a presumption that a federal
statute creating federal rights may be enforced in a section 1983 action." ' ,
79. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17.
80. Id. at 28.
81. Id.
82. Id
83. Indeed, welfare plaintiffs such as those in Thiboutot would seemingly be barred from
federal court. The State of Massachusetts recently advanced this argument in a welfare case,
but the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit gave the attempt short shrift.
See Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504, 509-12 (Ist Cir. 1983).
84. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 36-51 (White, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 51 (White J., dissenting).
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Also addressing the issue of what circumstances might rebut the presumption, he noted that Congress could preclude resort to section 1983 by indicating that the remedy in the governing statute is exclusive. His general
test for any such exception was that section 1983 would be available for
the enforcement of statutory rights "unless there is clear indication in a particular statute that its remedial provisions are exclusive or that for various
other reasons a § 1983 action is inconsistent with congressional intention." 86
In the Pennhurst case itself, Justice White had no difficulty determining
that grantor remedies were insufficient to. overcome the Thiboutot presumption. Thus, his opinion recognizes that Pennhurst could vitiate the thrust
of section 1983 as construed in Thiboutot. Justice White concluded that there
is "no indication that Congress intended the funds cutoff . . . to be the

sole remedy for correcting violations ..
."" He also found support for
this position from the legislative history and from a section of the Act unaddressed by Justice Rehnquist, which required states to provide administrative
and judicial means for individuals to assert violations of the Act. 8
The bearing of Pennhurston the Thiboutot interpretation of section 1983
is far from clear. Perhaps most significant is the fact that the majority simply
failed to address the presumption analysis that Justice White put forward
as the logical way of applying section 1983 to the cause of action question
in a particular case. Of course, its failure to respond to the argument does
not necessarily mean that the majority was rejecting the framework that
Justice White suggested. Nonetheless, the absence in Pennhurst of any
presumption analysis, and the apparent merging of the section 1983 and implied right inquiries left serious doubt as to the continuing validity of
Thiboutot, despite the fact that Justice Rehnquist had apparently cited it
with approval. 9 In any event, the uncertainties created by Pennhurst might
have been minimized by the fact that the relevant statements were dicta.
Shortly thereafter, however, the holding in Sea Clammers appeared to signal
that the Court in Pennhurst had meant what it said.
B.

Sea Clammers

Unlike Pennhurst, the principal issue in Sea Clammers was the ability of
private plaintiffs to get into a federal court to enforce federal statutes. In
Sea Clammers, an organization of fishermen challenged the manner in which
state and local authorities were permitting the discharge of pollutants which
seriously harmed the growth of fish in New York harbor and the Hudson
River. The bulk of the Supreme Court's opinion concerned whether plaintiffs could sue for damages under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act90
86. Id.at 51-52 (White, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 52 (White, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 52-53 (White, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
42 (1975)).

89. Id.at 28.
90. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. V
(1981)). Hereinafter, this statute will be cited as "FWPCA." Section 1365(a) allows a citizen
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or the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972. 91 Both
statutes contain specific "citizen suit" provisions, as well as extensive administrative remedies. 92 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, inquired first
as to the availability of an implied right of action under these two statutes.
He stressed the "unusually elaborate enforcement provisions"" contained
in the statutes and concluded that they were a strong indication that Congress intended to preclude any other form of private enforcement under the
Act. There is also in his opinion a strong element of the inclusio unius
approach. 9"
Although the parties had not argued the issue, Justice Powell also considered whether plaintiffs might find in section 1983, as construed in
Thiboutot, an "express congressional authorization of private suits under
these Acts." 9 In resolving this issue, he employed essentially the same analysis
which he had used in finding no implied cause of action: the comprehensiveness of the remedial devices provided by the Acts evidenced Congress's
intent to preclude alternative forms of private enforcement, including actions under section 1983.96 As Justice Powell stated, "It is hard to believe
that Congress intended to preserve the § 1983 right of action when it created
so many specific statutory remedies, including the two citizen-suit
provisions.""
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, dissented with respect to the
section 1983 holding.98 He utilized a presumption analysis similar to that
advocated by Justice White in his Pennhurst dissent and concluded that the
mere existence of a comprehensive remedial scheme is not by itself enough
to demonstrate that Congress intended to withdraw the express right of action conferred by section 1983.99 His analysis, however, is somewhat amto bring suit against anyone allegedly in violation of a standard or limitation under the Act.
Id. § 1365(a).
91. The Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444
(1976 & Supp. V 1981). Hereinafter, this statute will be cited as "MPRSA." Section 1415(g)
allows a citizen to bring suit against anyone allegedly in violation of a prohibition, limitation,
criterion, or permit under the Act. Id. § 1415(g).
92. The typical citizen suit provision contains a requirement of prior notice to the federal
agency administering the statute and limits the relief available. Injunctive relief rather than
damages is the norm.
93. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 12-13
(1981).
94. The Sea Clammers Court illustrated its application of the inclusio unius approach by
stating that "in view of these elaborate enforcement provisions it cannot be assumed that Congress intended to authorize by implication additional judicial remedies for private citizens suing
under MPRSA and FWPCA." Id. at 14-15 (quoting Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc.
v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979)).
95. Id. at 19 (emphasis in original).
96. Id. at 19-21.
97. Id. at 20.
98. Id. at 27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99. Id.at 27-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens identified two flaws in the majority's reasoning. First, the question should be whether Congress intended to withdraw the §
1983 remedy, not whether Congress intended to preserve it. Id. at 27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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biguous as to just how much Congress would have to do in order to
demonstrate any such intent. The key to Justice Stevens's willingness to find
for the plaintiffs in the Sea Clammers context appears to be the existence
of a savings clause in both statutes at issue.' Absent such a savings clause,
it is not clear how Justice Stevens would have resolved the section 1983 aspect
of the case, given the fact that he agreed with the majority as to the implied
right of action issue. '
Sea Clammers lends itself to two contrasting interpretations. Under an
optimistic reading, from the point of view of prospective plaintiffs, it is possible to view the case as simply one of the relatively few instances when Congress's action clearly must be interpreted to cut off the availability of any
section 1983 cause of action. Justice Powell did treat section 1983 as an
alternative means of finding a cause of action and noted that if section 1983
were available it "would obviate the need to consider whether Congress intended to authorize private suits to enforce . . . federal statutes."' 2 On
the other hand, as in Pennhurst, there is the strong suggestion that implied
right analysis and section 1983 analysis are essentially similar; thus, in applying either analysis, a court should focus on the same factors. In particular, the inclusio unius approach could eliminate the plaintiff's claim under
either theory. Moreover, there is an ambiguity in Justice Powell's reference
to whether Congress intended to foreclose private enforcement, or whether
Congress intended to preserve the section 1983 right of action. '0 3 Perhaps
most disturbing to those who would preserve Thiboutot is Justice Powell's
failure to directly address the presumption analysis developed at some length
by Justice Stevens in his dissent.'"" In an oblique footnote, Justice Powell
said only "we do not suggest that the burden is on a plaintiff to demonstrate
congressional intent to preserve § 1983 remedies." '
The presumption issue is of great practical significance. Under current approaches to implied right of action claims, it would appear that the defendant wins if the plaintiff fails to convince the court that Congress intended
to allow private enforcement under the statute in question.' 0 6 The defendant
Second, Justice Stevens believed that the language of the statutes explicitly indicated Congress's
intention not to withdraw a remedy under § 1983. Id. at 28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 29-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e), and MPRSA,
33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(5)). The purpose of a savings clause is to demonstrate that in passing
a particular statute that contains specified remedies, Congress did not intend to preempt plaintiffs from seeking relief under other laws, federal or state. Justice Stevens took the position
that § 1983 was a separate law of the sort envisioned by the savings clauses in the two statutes
before the Court.
101. Id. at 25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 19.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 27 n.l (Stevens, J., dissenting) (burden should be on defendant to show that
Congress intended to exclude § 1983 remedy, rather than on the plaintiff to show that Congress intended the remedy to be available).
105. Id. at 20 n.31.
106. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77
(1981). This point, however, is not always clear from federal court opinions addressing implied
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need not go so far as to show that Congress specifically addressed the issue
and determined that private causes of action should not be implied from
the statute. However, if the Thiboutot presumption analysis advocated by
Justices White and Stevens is applicable, the defendant will have to make
just such a showing. The significance of the two different approaches is that
legislative history and other aids to statutory construction will, in most cases,
be entirely silent as to the matter. Thus, the burden of proof requirement
will be dispositive of whether a cause of action exists. In this respect, the
fact that Justice Powell had such a clear opportunity to address the validity
of presumption analysis, yet chose not to do so, may well support a narrower interpretation of the Sea Clammers decision.
Whatever one thinks of Thiboutot, the Supreme Court is surely open to
criticism for the very uncertain guidance which Pennhurst and Sea Clammers furnish for courts and litigants attempting to determine when the section 1983 remedy, ostensibly made available by Thiboutot, has been
withdrawn. One approach is to focus on the Pennhurst dictum, and to conclude that section 1983 is never available when an implied right of action
would not also be found. Nevertheless, it is possible to emphasize the positive
reading of Sea Clammers, especially the focus on very elaborate remedial
schemes that include private judicial enforcement. Both decisions seem to
cite Thiboutot as good law. Thus, some form of presumption analysis may
be valid, despite the Court's failure to confer specific approval upon that
approach.
In sum, it is difficult to determine just how far the Supreme Court has
cut back on the expansive thrust of Thiboutot. Given the numerous warning
signals contained in the two subsequent decisions, 07 however, plus other factors, such as the identity and views of the Justices who wrote them, it is
tempting to conclude that Thiboutot has virtually been overruled sub silentio. The Supreme Court certainly has the authority to do this. Indeed, such
a process may have taken place with respect to National League of Cities
v. Usery,'1 8 as Justice Stevens has recently suggested. 0 9 The problem for
the lower courts, however, is that they do not have the authority to overrule
Supreme Court precedent. Therefore, until the High Court has spoken, they
must treat Thiboutot as good law, all the while attempting to bring to bear
the obvious qualification which flows from Pennhurst and Sea Clammers.
Not surprisingly, lower courts have found this a difficult task and have
reached sharply conflicting results.
rights issues. Some decisions state that there is no indication as to whether Congress intended
to create a private right of action, while other decisions state that analysis reveals that Congress never intended to create such a right. Compare Northwest Airlines, supra, with Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981). Nevertheless, it would seem that the plaintiff must demonstrate that he is authorized to bring suit. See Boatowners and Tenants Ass'n
v. Port of Seattle, 716 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1983).
107. See supra notes 77-105 and accompanying text.
108. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
109. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1067 (1983)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
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IN, CONFUSION OUT

Post-Thiboutot attempts to utilize section 1983 have arisen in the context
of a number of federal grant programs. In one class of cases the lower courts
have achieved relatively uniform results. These cases arise under statutes that
contain explicit provisions for judicial enforcement against the specific defendant before the court. Following Sea Clammers, most lower courts have concluded that this is the paradigmatic situation in which section 1983 is not
independently available. The source of most of this litigation is the Education for All Handicapped Children Act.'" The Act grants funds to states
to support the education of handicapped children. A state which agrees to
participate must provide all children with a "free appropriate public
education."'. This requirement has generated a substantial volume of suits
initiated by parents who believe their handicapped children are not receiving
educational treatment that meets the statutorily imposed standard.
The leading case on the possible recourse to section 1983 in such suits
is the Seventh Circuit's decision in Anderson v. Thompson." The principal
issue in Anderson was the availability of damages for improper placement
of a child covered by the Act." 3 The Act provides for private judicial enforcement and authorizes "such relief as the court determines is
appropriate.""' The Seventh Circuit first concluded that "absent exceptional
circumstances," it would be inconsistent with congressional intent to award
damages under the statute.' 5 The court noted, among other factors, the effect which a damage remedy would have on educational financing." 6 Alternatively, the plaintiffs argued that they had an express right of action to
enforce the Act under section 1983 as interpreted in Thiboutot. In rejecting
this argument, the Seventh Circuit relied primarily on the Pennhurst dictum
and on cases such as Brown v. General Service Administration"7 and Great

110. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1405, 1406,

1411-1420 (1982). Hereinafter, this statute will be cited as "EAHCA."
111. Id. § 1412(1).
112. 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981).
113. Id. at 1206. Plaintiffs, parents of a child needing special education, sought review of

the state superintendent's evaluation and recommendation of their child's educational needs.
Contending that their daughter belonged in a special private school, the plaintiffs sought damages
for tuition, court costs, and attorney's fees. Id. at 1207.
114. EAHCA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). A parent or guardian who has a complaint about
the state's educational evaluation or placement of the handicapped child may request an impartial hearing from the state or local educational agency. Id. § 1415(b)(2). Any party may appeal
the result of the hearing to a reviewing officer, who then makes an independent decision. Id.
§ 1415(c). An aggrieved party may then appeal the decision of the reviewing officer by bringing

an action in state or federal court. Id. § 1415(e)(2).
115. Anderson, 658 F.2d at 1217. Exceptional circumstances arise when the state school does
not provide for the child's physical health or when the state demonstrates bad faith by failing
to follow statutory procedures. Id. at 1213-14.
116. Id. at 1212.
117. 425 U.S. 820 (1976).
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American Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Novotny,"' in which
elaborate administrative and judicial enforcement schemes had been held to
preclude relief under other theories." 9 The Anderson court concluded that
whenever section 1983 relief would be inconsistent with an extensive statutory
scheme, the Pennhurst exception comes into play.' 20
The result in Anderson is not surprising; it seems on all fours with the
factual situation before the Court in Sea Clammers, and the overwhelming
trend in EAHCA cases has been to follow the Anderson result.' 2 ' The same
result has been reached under the General Revenue Sharing Act, another
program with elaborate remedial schemes including judicial remedies.' 22 Far
more difficult, however, have been cases in which the remedial scheme in
the underlying statute is sufficiently circumscribed that a plaintiff might
plausibly argue either an implied right of action to enforce the statute or
an express right of action under section 1983. Not surprisingly, plaintiffs
do argue both grounds in such cases, and the attempt to answer these
arguments after the Thiboutot-Pennhurst-Sea Clammers triad has led the
lower courts in a variety of directions.
A.

Merging the Two Inquiries'"

In a number of cases, the courts appear to have reached the conclusion
that the two inquiries are essentially the same.' 24 A good example is the

118. 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
119. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 373, 378 (unimpaired effectiveness can be attributed to Title VII's
comprehensive plan of administrative and judicial remedies only by holding that Title VII violations cannot be the basis for a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)); Brown, 425 U.S.
at 828-29 (Congress intended an express right of action under Title VII to be an exclusive,
preemptive judicial remedy).
120. Anderson, 658 F.2d at 1215-16; see also Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
n.5 (1970) (plaintiff's cause of action, violation of Public Accommodations Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(a), cannot serve as a basis for damages under § 1983 because injunctive relief is an
exclusive means of enforcing rights under the Act).
121. See, e.g., Flavin v. Connecticut State Bd. of Educ., 553 F. Supp. 827, 832 (D. Conn.
1982) (allowing § 1983 suit based on violation of EAHCA would be inconsistent with detailed,
comprehensive remedial scheme of EAHCA); Calhoun v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 550 F.
Supp. 796, 804 (N.D. I11.1982) (exclusive judicial remedy under EAHCA § 1415 barred recovery
of damages or attorney's fees under § 1983 for alleged violations of EAHCA); Noe v. Ambach, 542 F. Supp. 70, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (suit brought under § 1983 would be entirely redundant of EAHCA's express authorization of private right of action); Ruth Anne M. v. Alvin
Indep. School Dist., 532 F. Supp. 460, 495 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (comprehensive remedial scheme
of EAHCA implies legislative intent to provide exclusive remedy, thus barring action under
§ 1983 to enforce rights created by EAHCA); see also infra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Meyerson v. Arizona, 507 F. Supp. 859, 864 (D. Ariz. 1981), aff'd on other
grounds, 709 F.2d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 1983).
123. See infra notes 220-31 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., infra notes 125-30 (discussing Polchowski v. Gorris, 714 F.2d 749 (7th Cir.
1983)); see also Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n Local 94 v. City of New York, 676 F.2d 20,
22 (2d Cir. 1982) (Congress intended exclusive administrative remedies under CETA, 29 U.S.C.
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recent Seventh Circuit decision in Polchowski v. Gorris."5 The plaintiff
asserted that the defendant police chief had released statistical and criminal
history information in violation of the Justice System Improvement Act of
1979.'26 The Act contained no provision for private enforcement against state
and local officials who violate it. Thus, the plaintiff attempted to base a
damages claim on section 1983 as interpreted in Thiboutot. In addressing
this issue, the court stated that "the inquiry resembles the analysis used to
determine whether a private cause of action may be implied from an enactment of Congress. . . . In either instance, a party must demonstrate that
Congress intended to create a right which may be privately enforced.""'
The court noted the two exceptions to Thiboutot established in Pennhurst
and Sea Clammers and found that the Act's prohibition of disclosure of
information clearly created rights for the benefit of an identifiable class of
persons, presumably including the plaintiff. Violations of the Act, however,
can be enforced against federal officials through the Privacy Act of 1974,2
even though the Privacy Act does not permit suits against nonfederal officials under circumstances such as those in Polchowski. The court also noted
that the original version of the bill had contained remedies for improper
disclosure by state and local officials.' 9 Thus, the court held that independent enforcement under section 1983 had been precluded by Congress. When
the plaintiff attempted belatedly to argue, in the alternative, for an implied
cause of action, the court dismissed any such possibility as having been
disposed of by its section 1983 analysis.' 30 It is true that the Polchowski
court was not presented with the circumstance in which Congress simply
failed to address the issue of private enforcement, a situation in which a
different analysis might govern the implied right and section 1983 questions.
Nonetheless, the casualness with which the court equated the two issues is

§§ 801-966, thereby precluding private right of action and barring § 1983 suit); Members,
Bridgeport Hous. Auth. Police v. City of Bridgeport, 564 F. Supp. 2, 6 (D. Conn. 1982) (Model
Cities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3374, having implied private right of action, lacks sufficiently
comprehensive remedial scheme to preclude § 1983 suit); Moxley v. Vernot, 555 F. Supp. 554,
559-60 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (because private cause of action does not exist under Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 793, plaintiff may not maintain cause of action under § 1983).
125. 714 F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1983).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 3789(g) (Supp. V 1981). Section 3789(g) provides that criminal history information may not be used or revealed for other than research or statistical purposes. The
information is also immune from process and is inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.
Id. § 3789(g)(a). Procedures must be designed to assure currency, privacy and security of information. Id. § 3789(g)(b).
127. 714 F.2d at 751.
128. Id. at 752 (Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1982), provides comprehensive private
remedies against agencies of the federal government for unwarranted disclosures of personal
information).
129. Id. The provisions for remedies against state authorities were deleted because of the
uncertainty of their effect and the lack of information for devising an appropriate remedy.
Id. (citing S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1974)).
130. Id. at 752 n.5.
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typical of other decisions since 1981, which appear to merge the two
inquiries. 131
At least two courts have engaged in what might be termed de facto
merger. 32 In such cases, the courts recognize explicitly that the section 1983
and implied right inquiries are different, but proceed to resolve them by
relying on the same aspects of the statutory scheme. A good example is the
Ninth Circuit decision in Meyerson v. State of Arizona.'33 In Meyerson, a
handicapped professor, alleging handicapped-based discrimination by an institution receiving federal funds, sought relief under several federal statutes.
One of the statutes at issue was section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.1'1 A prior holding in the same circuit had established that section 503
does not give rise to a private right of action. 3 ' Nonetheless, plaintiff attempted to assert section 503 claims under section 1983 as interpreted in
Thiboutot. The court of appeals recognized that the implied right and section 1983 inquiries are different, notably in the allocation of the burden
of proof.'36 It found the exclusive remedy exception to Thiboutot applicable
since in its earlier decision on the implied right issue it had concluded that
"a private right of action under section 503 would be inconsistent with the
administrative scheme provided by Congress."' 37 For the court, inconsistency
was inconsistency, regardless of which basis the plaintiff invoked for his
right of action. The net effect of the decision was that the same remedial
structure (which, it should be noted, was administrative only) was found
to preclude private enforcement of the underlying statute under either theory.
B. Making the Presumption Dispositive
A number of courts, building on the dissents by Justices Stevens and White
in Sea Clammers and Pennhurst, respectively, have applied a presumption
analysis that permits a plaintiff to go forward on an express right of action

131. See cases cited supra note 124.
132. Crawford v. Janklow, 710 F.2d 1321, 1326 (8th Cir. 1983) (factors that show an implied private right of action "suggest that the Low-income Home Energy Assistance Act [of
1981, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8621-8629 (Supp. V 1981)] created substantial rights for section 1983 purposes"); Meyerson v. Arizona, 709 F.2d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Congress intended to
foreclose private actions under section 503 [of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§ 793 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)], whether they are brought directly under section 503 or indirectly
under section 1983.").
133. 709 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1983).
134. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
135. See Fisher v. City of Tucson, 663 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
178 (1982).
136. 709 F.2d at 1239-40 n.3 ("The burden is on the plaintiff to show that Congress intended to create a private cause of action when it enacted a particular statute. On the other
hand, the burden is not on the plaintiff to demonstrate congressional intent to preserve section
1983 remedies.").
137. Id. at 1239 (referring to its holding in Fisher v. City of Tucson, 663 F.2d 861 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 178 (1982)).
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basis under section 1983 in circumstances that would not permit finding an
implied right of action.' 38 The leading case is Ryans v. New Jersey Commission for the Blind.'39 The plaintiff complained of denials by defendants of
rehabilitative services and benefits to which he was entitled under Title I
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.1'" Title I contains no provision for private
judicial enforcement, although a 1978 amendment to the original Act added
limited administrative procedures through which handicapped individuals can
seek review of determinations affecting them. "' The court first addressed
the possible existence of an implied private right of action under the Act.
It utilized the four-factor test of Cort v. Ash' 2 and relied extensively on
legislative history in concluding that Congress did not intend to create any
such right. " 3 In stressing that one version of the 1978 amendments provided
for judicial review of administrative proceedings, the Ryans court concluded
limiting any private enthat the resultant version was a clear compromise
44
forcement to the administrative realm.
The court then turned to the possibility of an express right of action under
section 1983. Unlike the circuit court in Polchowski it recognized the
analytical difference between the two forms of inquiry, characterizing them
as "similar, but not identical."'' 41 In particular, the court read Sea Clammers as establishing that "the court must presume a section 1983 right of
action to exist unless there is evidence in the underlying statute which suggests an intent on the part of Congress to foreclose such an action.'" This
138. Boatowner and Tenants Ass'n v. Port of Seattle, 716 F.2d 669, 674 (9th Cir. 1983)
(plaintiff must prove congressional intent to create private right of action when suing directly
under the federal statute but not when suing under § 1983; presumption that federal statute
may be enforced through § 1983 action is rebuttable by evidence of congressional intent to
preclude private means of enforcement) (dictum); Ryans v. New Jersey Comm'n for the Blind
and Visually Impaired, 542 F. Supp. 841, 846 (D.N.J. 1982) (even though no implied right
of action exists under a statute, "the court must presume that a § 1983 right of action exists
unless there is evidence in the underlying statute which suggests an intent on the part of Congress to foreclose such an action") (emphasis in original); Balf Co. v. Gaitor, 534 F. Supp.
600, 604-05 (D. Conn. 1982) (plaintiff in a § 1983 action is required only to demonstrate that
he has suffered an injury by the administration of a joint federal-state cooperative program
and that he was an intended beneficiary of that program); cf. Rollison v. Biggs, 567 F. Supp.
964, 970 (D. Del. 1983) (EAHCA would be enforceable under § 1983 if not for comprehensive
remedial scheme that indicates congressional intent to preclude § 1983 right of action).
139. 542 F. Supp. 841 (D.N.J. 1982).
140. 29 U.S.C. §§ 720-750 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The plaintiff contended that his rights
under § 723 had been violated. 542 F. Supp. at 844. That section provides that a handicapped
person must be supplied with any goods or services necessary to render the person employable.
29 U.S.C. § 723.
141. Ryans, 542 F. Supp. at 845. The 1978 amendment added subsection § 722(d), Pub.
L. No. 95-602 § 103(2), 92 Stat. 2955, 2959-60 (1978), which established limited administrative
review.
142. See 542 F. Supp. at 844-46 (citing Cort, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 845-46.
145. Id. at 848.
146. Id. (emphasis in original).
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reasoning led to the possibility that a plaintiff might lose on the implied
right issue but win with respect to the availability of section 1983.
Somewhat surprisingly, the Ryans court concluded that Congress had not
intended to preclude private enforcement via section 1983. Even though it
had earlier suggested that the only conclusion to be drawn from the legislative
history was that a compromise had been struck which excluded judicial enforcement, the court stated somewhat elliptically that "the conference committee might equally well have chosen not to include a remedy in [the Act]
because it assumed that a § 1983 action was already available and would
suffice."' 7 The court drew an important distinction from Sea Clammers in
which the underlying statute contained private enforcement provisions, noting
that resort to section 1983 in such a circumstance might result in circumvention of any procedural limits attached to the explicit private causes of
action.' 8 Because Title I contained no private cause of action at all, allowing enforcement via section 1983 could not conflict with any other judicial
remedy.' 49 Apart from the dubious reasoning in its discussion of the legislative
history, the Ryans court's application of the presumption analysis appears
faithful to the broad reading of Thiboutot as well as to the method for
applying it which Justices Stevens and White recommended.
C. Implied Rights of Action as Precluding Section 1983
A number of courts have reached a conclusion that seems diametrically
opposed to the presumption analysis of Ryans and similar cases. These decisions have held that when a court can validly infer a private right of action
for injunctive relief from the underlying federal statute, enforceability under
section 1983 is precluded in accordance with the exclusive remedy exception
developed in Pennhurst and Sea Clammers.'5 ° A good example is Ruth Anne
M. v. Alvin Independent School District,'5' which addressed the availability
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. Id.
149. Id. (because a plaintiff would first have to exhaust the statutory administrative remedies,
a § 1983 remedy would be complementary rather than inconsistent).
150. See Longoria v. Harris, 554 F. Supp. 102, 107 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (implied right of action
for equitable relief under § 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973 precludes action for damages
under § 1983); Flavin v. Connecticut State Bd. of Educ., 553 F. Supp. 827, 831 (D. Conn.
1982) (the comprehensive remedial framework provided by 20 U.S.C. § 1400 is exclusive and
precludes a right of action under § 504 and § 1983); Manecke v. School Bd., 553 F. Supp.
787, 791 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (court's ruling that § 504 only provides equitable relief would be
circumvented by concluding that damage claims are allowable under § 1983); Ruth Anne M.
v. Alvin Indep. School Dist., 532 F. Supp. 460, 476 (S.D. Tex. 1982) ("supplemental damage
remedy afforded by section 1983 would threaten to eviscerate the congressional objectives underlying section 504" of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, under which courts have found an implied
right of action solely for equitable relief); Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 203 (D.N.H.
1981) (plaintiffs were precluded from bringing a § 1983 action against state officials because
the right to compel Secretary of Health & Human Services to perform mandatory statutory
duties is an exclusive remedy implied under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill
of Rights Act).
151. 532 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
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of damages in a controversy surrounding the placement of a handicapped

child. Apart from remedies under the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act, the plaintiffs sought relief under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.152 The court engaged in an extensive analysis of the

availability of an implied right and concluded that given precedents such
as Cannon v. University of Chicago,"' as well as the legislative history, Congress must have envisaged the availability of some private judicial
enforcement.
The court balked, however, at including a damage remedy within that enforcement, despite the plaintiff's invocation of the familiar statement in Bell
v. Hood that
when federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule

from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so
as to grant the necessary relief. And it is also well settled that where legal
rights have been invaded and a federal statute provides for a general right
to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to
make good the wrong done.'54
The Ruth Anne court recognized that damages would further the vindication of section 504 rights. It stressed, however, that awarding damages might

well be inconsistent with the congressional provision of funds for the program in question, because any award would constitute a drain on the funds.
The court also noted that the availability of damages unpredictable in amount
could be a major disincentive to participation in any federal grant program
governed by section 504.111 The plaintiff argued that regardless of the result
of implied right analysis, section 1983 under Thiboutot clearly presented a
152. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides in pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States . . . shall solely
by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ...
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
153. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). The plaintiff, an unsuccessful medical school applicant, brought
an action against two medical schools under § 901 of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982), alleging sex discrimination. Section 901 provides, in pertinent part, "No person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.
...Id. The Cannon Court applied the four-part test set out in Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66 (1975), and concluded that an implied private cause of action existed under
§ 901. 441 U.S. at 709. In response to the University's argument that Title IX's express remedy,
the cutoff of federal funds, foreclosed an implied private remedy, the Court stated:
The fact that other provisions of a complex statutory scheme create express remedies
has not been accepted as a sufficient reason for refusing to imply an otherwise
appropriate remedy under a separate section. Rather, the Court has generally avoided
this type of "excursion into extrapolation of legislative intent," unless there is other,
more convincing, evidence that Congress meant to exclude the remedy.
Id. at 711 (citation omitted).
154. Ruth Anne, 532 F. Supp. at 470 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
155. Id. at 472-73.
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cause of action with an express panoply of remedies, including damages.
The court did not undertake the herculean task of arguing that the plain
language of section 1983 does not include the availability of damages as
a remedy. Rather, it concluded that under Pennhurst and Sea Clammers,
the finding of legislative intent to create a limited private right of action
showed, at the same time, congressional intent to preclude any action under
section 1983.116
The court's conclusion with respect to the availability of section 1983 is
remarkable in several respects. Analytically, it would seem that the express
section 1983 cause of action takes precedence over any potential implied right
to sue. Moreover, a fundamental assumption of the exclusive remedy exception to the Thiboutot principle is that Congress has spoken with respect to
the nature and types of remedies to be available for the enforcement of a
particular statute. In the section 504 context Congress had indicated nothing
at all about private judicial remedies. Yet the Ruth Anne court was able
to infer, from silence, an intent to create and also an intent to limit remedies,
thereby precluding actions under section 1983."' This conclusion rests on
double conjecture by the court, because Congress had addressed neither the
existence of private judicial relief, nor its possible relationship to relief under
section 1983. Apart from possible doubts about the validity of Thiboutot
itself, the court was obviously swayed by the grave questions which would
be raised by awarding damages for violations of conditions attached to federal
grant programs. A number of other district courts have followed the example set in Ruth Anne, and have ruled that once an implied cause of action
for injunctive relief has been found in a federal grant statute, section 1983
is inapplicable." 8
In sum, the pattern of case law discussed above is clearly an unruly one,
manifesting the many different pressures that the Thiboutot-Pennhurst-Sea
Clammers triad exerts on the federal judiciary when considering federal
statutes that do not deal with the issue of private enforcement. The question arises whether such confusion is inevitable, or whether a coherent, unifying principle can be developed that will both bring clarity to the area and
save Thiboutot. It is into this breach that numerous commentators have flung
themselves. Again, not surprisingly, the answers differ widely.
IV.

SAVING THIBOUTOT-THE LAW REVIEWS TO THE RESCUE

One thing which is clear from the judicial developments since 1981 is that
Pennhurst and Sea Clammers have cut back considerably on the apparent

156. Id. at 475. The court first found the implied private remedy under § 504 to be limited
to equitable relief. Because § 1983 relief is not so limited, the court concluded that allowing
a damage remedy under § 1983 "would threaten to eviscerate the congressional objectives underlying section 504." Id.
157. Id.
158. See cases cited supra note 150.
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sweep of the Thiboutot decision. 59 A number of commentators have sought
to prevent this "evisceration"' 6 and have focused their attacks on the apparent tendency in the two later cases to assimilate, if not to merge altogether,
the implied right and section 1983 inquiries. Two principal arguments against
such merging have been put forward. The first is that because section 1983
represents direct congressional authorization, any questions as to the power
of the federal courts to act in a common law capacity which are present
in the implied right context become irrelevant. ' 6' The second argument is
that section 1983 suits are fundamentally different from implied causes of
action in that the former deal with a discrete and limited number of
defendants-state and local officials-and that it is entirely consistent with
national policy to favor federal court action against such defendants.' 6' Thus,
defenders of Thiboutot raise the question of whether the methodology found
63
in Pennhurst and Sea Clammers can and should be modified.
The arguments in favor of merging the two inquiries are discussed at some
length in Section V of this article.' 6 It must be pointed out, however, that
the notion that issues of judicial authority simply disappear after Thiboutot
is not quite as straightforward as suggested. To say that post-Thiboutot courts
are merely carrying out the will of the 1874 Congress is stretching a bit.
At least one commentator has noted that "Section 1983 . . . seems to have
become a judicially created remedy much like the implied right of action,
and it would seem logical that the analysis of whether a section 1983 remedy
exists should be similar to the analysis used to determine whether an implied right of action exists." '' 6 It must also be remembered that at issue
is the authority of the court vis-a-vis the authority of the Congress that
enacted the underlying statute.
Of somewhat greater force is the argument that because state and local
defendants stand on a sufficiently different footing from other defendants,
the 1983 analysis should be totally divorced from implied right analysis. A
principal purpose of section 1983 was to provide a federal forum for abuses
by state and local officials.' 6 6 The question remains whether extensive judicial
159. The Ruth Anne group of cases is probably the most dramatic example of this process
of cutting back. See cases cited supra note 150.
160. See, e.g., Note, Preclusion of Section 1983, supra note 26, at 1189 ("Indiscriminate
In seccomprehensiveness test could seal off access to the supplemental federal remedies ....
tion 1983 actions, intemperate application would render the statutory reference of section 1983
without effect and eviscerate the Thiboutot decision.").
161. See Wartelle and Louden, supra note 10, at 537.
162. Id.at 537-38.
163. See id. at 540 (test should be whether "plaintiff's injury fall[s] within the zone of interest the statute is designed to protect"); see also Note, Implied Rights and Section 1983,
supra note 23, at 1469 (Court should assume that the scope of § 1983 has not been foreclosed
by the unexpressed intent of Congress).
164. See infra notes 220-31 and accompanying text.
165. See Note, The Section 1983 Remedy, supra note 26, at 477.
166. See, e.g., Wartelle and Louden, supra note 10, at 519 ("it is hardly implausible that
the Forty-third Congress should have meant what it said when it created expansive federal
liability for violation, under color of state law, of federal statutes"); Note, Preclusion of Sec-
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oversight of state and local officials in, for example, the operation of federal
grant programs is so clearly desirable as not to warrant debate. Paul Wartelle
and Jeffrey Hadley Lauden appear to think so. They argue that considerations of national uniformity as well as the inadequacies of federal administrative oversight require broad supervision by the federal courts.' 67 As
they put it, "There is an unavoidable tension built into the basic structure
of the joint state-federal program-a tension between the desirability of local
decision making and the need for national uniformity-that can only be effectively managed through judicial oversight."' 68
The desirability of such an expansive federal role, however, is far from
clear. Wartelle and Lauden present the matter as if the federal interests come
into play on only one side of the equation, the side favoring the availability
of the federal courts.' 69 Are there not federalism interests, in the broadest
sense, which argue against any such facile conclusion? It is certainly arguable
that the value of a decentralized system, which relies heavily on subnational
units to perform basic tasks, can be seriously eroded if the citizens of those
units feel that in the event of a disagreement between themselves and their
governments, the federal courts should be the first, and preferred, avenue
of recourse. In the grant context, such an approach can only serve to enhance
the already one-sided, centralist character of most of the grant programs
now in place. On a more specific level, it is important to point out again
the negative consequences of extensive judicial involvement in grant programs.
Damages awards and attorney's fees, for example, may deplete funds from
the very purposes which the program was meant to serve. There is the realistic
possibility that, at least in the case of marginal programs, governments will
decline to participate if they see serious, and unpredictable, costs. Additionally, extensive judicial involvement blurs matters of accountability. 7 ' The
debate over judicial involvement in grant programs has recently begun to
heat up' 7 ' and it is clear that the issue is not as one-sided as the defenders
of Thiboutot contend.
tion 1983, supra note 26, at 1194-95. (Congress "interpose[d] the federal courts between the
states and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights") (quoting Mitchum v. Foster,
407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)).
167. Wartelle and Louden, supra note 10, at 538-40.
168. Id. at 540 (emphasis added).
169. See id. at 538-40; see also Bator, Some Thoughts on Applied Federalism, 6 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 51, 55 (1982) ("We have come to think, in these confrontations between state
and local authority on the one hand and individuals on the other, that the Constitution is
on only one side of the case.").
170. See Brown, The Courts and Grant Reform: A Time for Action, 7 INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PERSPECTIVE 6, 14 (1981). If the federal courts join the federal grantor agencies as significant
participants in the operation of grant programs, it will become increasingly difficult for citizens
of grantee jurisdictions to determine who is running a particular program. On the general problem of accountability in federal grant programs, see ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN BRIEF-THE FEDERAL ROLE IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: THE DYNAMICS OF

GROWTH 24-26 (1980).

171. Brown, supra note 170, at 11; see, e.g., R.
Note, Preclusion of Section 1983, supra note 23.

CAPPALLI,

supra note 9,

at

§§ 8:37, 8:47;
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A Presumption Rebutted by Legislative "Intent" or "Clear
Expression'"

The important question is the extent to which defenders of Thiboutot who
view Pennhurst and Sea Clammers as incorrect limitations on that decision
have come forward with a viable alternative. Wartelle and Louden argue
that the burden of displacing section 1983 should be on the defendant, "unless
there is clear evidence that Congress intended to withdraw it."' 72 They appear to accept the exclusive remedy doctrine enunciated in Sea Clammers,
although they state that Justice Stevens, who dissented, was correct in that
case. The relevant quote from his dissent is as follows: "A defendant may
carry this burden by identifying express statutory language or legislative
history revealing Congress's intent to foreclose the § 1983 remedy, or by
establishing that Congress intended that the remedies provided in the substantive statute itself be exclusive."' 7 3 Neither Wartelle and Louden nor Justice
Stevens, hovever, cites a single instance of a specific statute which would
do this. As developed below,' any test which calls for "clear evidence"
or something similar will prove to be meaningless because evidence will almost
never exist. This may not bother Wartelle and Louden. They accuse the Court
of having "stacked the deck against private litigants and Congress" in Pennhurst and Sea Clammers"5 and apparently conclude that the way to prevent
the evisceration of Thiboutot is to eviscerate Pennhurst and Sea Clammers.
A student commentator who seems somewhat less enthusiastic about
Thiboutot, and sees less of a difference between implied right and section
1983 analyses,' nonetheless suggests a similar approach. According to this
commentator, the keystone should be legislative intent, as in the implied
right cases, and a presumption should be employed which the defendant might
rebut by evidence such as legislative history.'" This commentator at least
gives a specific example of how to apply his approach: the statute involved
in the Ryans case.' 8 He concludes, however, that Ryans was wrongly decided
and that the same analysis which precluded an implied right of action should
have served to prevent an action under section 1983 as well. After all, Congress had considered, and rejected, a judicial review amendment to Title
I of the Act in question. The commentator states that "[tihese indications
of congressional intent not to allow a judicial remedy under Title I, as well
as the detailed administrative remedy, would be sufficient under the proposed approach to show that Congress intended to preclude a section 1983
172. Wartelle and Louden, supra note 10, at 543.
173. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 27 n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. See infra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
175. Wartelle and Louden, supra note 10, at 535.
176. See Note, The Section 1983 Remedy, supra note 26, at 481-82 (noting arguments for
and against the Thiboutot decision and suggesting clarification by Congress of § 1983's scope).
177. Id. at 476-77.
178. Id. at 469-71 (discussing Ryans v. New Jersey Comm'n for the Blind and Visually Impaired, 542 F. Supp. 841 (D.N.J. 1982)).
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Once again, the problem is that specific evidence

denying' a section 1983 remedy will almost never be found. Thus the author,
after some initial hesitation, is forced to fall back on such concepts as "comprehensive enforcement scheme," "inconsistency" between section 1983 and
the statutory scheme, and "legislative history.""' It is far from clear whether,
and to what extent, this approach marks any departure from Sea Clammers.
Another student commentator starts from the proposition that Sea Clammers wrongly merged the two inquiries." 2 Contrary to the preceding analysis,
he argues that rules developed in the context of implied rights are simply
irrelevant to the section 1983 inquiry. With regard to a situation such as
that present in Sea Clammers, he argues that it is not unreasonable to conclude that
Congress, in providing remedial schemes replete with administrative proceedings and citizen suit provisions within the substantive statute, also might
have concluded that private access to the federal forum is necessary to
serve as a further check on the state participants in joint federal-state
regulatory endeavors, federal actors already being under sufficient executive
and legislative control."'

The proposed solution is an approach requiring considerably more evidence
of preclusion than is the case with implied right analysis. The author recommends a criterion of a "clear expression of congressional intent to withdraw
the remedy."" ' 4 Once again, it is hard to tell where this expression would
be found, although we know that a comprehensive remedial scheme is not
necessarily enough. A requirement of "clear expression" sounds even tougher
to satisfy than "clear evidence." In practice, however, they would probably
always produce the same result: nullification of Pennhurst and Sea Clammers. At least this commentator admits that as his goal." '

It seems apparent that whatever the merits of their views of Pennhurst
and Sea Clammers, the authors discussed in the preceding paragraphs have
failed to come up with an alternative approach which harmonizes the
Thiboutot-Pennhurst-SeaClammers triad. This failure is probably traceable
to the major problem inherent in trying to make Thiboutot workable. The
Congress that enacted the underlying statute was almost certainly unaware
of the possibility of section 1983 enforcement. It is illogical, therefore, to
expect Congress to have stated, either in the statute or in the legislative
history, anything with respect to whether section 1983 is to apply. In these
circumstances, then, turning to the implied right inquiry is not as indefensible as some authors suggest, because it is the only extant mode of analysis

179. Id. at 480.
180. Id. at 479 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)).
181. Id. at 482.
182. Note, Implied Rights and Section 1983, supra note 23, at 1441, 1469.

183. Id.at 1469.
184. Id.at 1470.
185. Id. at 1468-70 (suggesting a congressional, rather than judicial, solution).
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for dealing with this phenomenon of statutes that are silent as to alternative
methods of enforcement. The rejection by these authors of any analogy to
implied rights analysis is probably traceable to the Court's current approach
to implied rights.' 88
It might. be argued that this problem is only a transitory phenomenon,
applicable to statutes enacted prior to the 1980 Thiboutot decision. As noted,
grant statutes are usually authorized for a limited period of time.' 87 Any
Congress, therefore, that reenacted a grant statute after 1980 should be
presumed to have known what the law is under Thiboutot and, consequently,
failure to indicate a desire to preclude section 1983 will leave the presumption intact. Once again, the inherently fictional nature of Thiboutot rears
its head. What about Congresses that enact statutes after the decisions in
Pennhurst and Sea Clammers? Those Congresses might well have assumed
that (1) the Supreme Court had merged the section 1983 and implied right
analyses, (2) under current approaches to the latter, an implied right of action will rarely be found, and thus (3) Congress simply need not worry about
enforcement of a sort different from that for which it provided in the statute.
In other words, trying to impute knowledge of the law to Congress will not
work in a circumstance such as this where the law is unknowable by anyone.
Because of the deficiencies inherent in any effort to rehabilitate Thiboutot
by considering legislative intent, some commentators have taken the logical
step of urging inquiries that go beyond traditional means of attempting to
discern the intent of the Congress that enacted the underlying statute.
B.

Beyond Legislative Intent

Perhaps the most ambitious undertaking in this direction is Professor Cass
Sunstein's analysis of when private enforcement under section 1983 is
available.' 8 He recognizes the core of the problem as
the fact that in almost all cases there will be virtually no evidence of [congressional] intent. It has only been in unusual circumstances that Congress has explicitly precluded private remedies in designing a regulatory
scheme. It has also been rare that the issue has been addressed in the
legislative history. The question of the continued availability of section
1983 is almost invariably one to which Congress devoted little or no
thought, for Congress has not as an institution generally been aware that
section 1983 creates a remedy for all statutory violations."'
Sunstein advocates a process of "rescontructing legislative intent,'" 9 0 which
186. See Wartelle and Louden, supra note 10, at 536 ("the Court has become quite frank
in its hostility toward private implied rights of action to enforce federal statutes").
187. The 1976 renewal of general revenue sharing generated substantial debate over the operation of that program. Opponents extracted substantial modification as the price for an additional renewal. See generally Brown, Beyond the New Federalism-Revenue Sharingin Perspective,
15 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1977).

188. Sunstein, supra note 26.
189. Id.at 418.
190. Id. at 436.

WHITHER THIBOUTOT?

1983]

involves "a relatively independent judicial assessment of the likelihood that
the statutory enforcement mechanism and the section 1983 remedy can be
coordinated into a workable regulatory scheme." 9 ' The task for the courts
is described in general terms as "identifying those contexts in which the
presumption in favor of the continued availability of the section 1983 remedy
should be regarded as rebutted because of manifest inconsistency between
the statutory enforcement scheme and a private cause of action."' 9 2 His use
of the phrase "manifest inconsistency" suggests a burden which the defendant would almost never succeed in carrying. At another point, however,
Sunstein offers a somewhat less rigorous statement of his general approach:
identifying "what sorts of regulatory schemes are likely to be inconsistent
with preservation of the section 1983 remedy." ' 93
Thus, it is somewhat unclear at the outset exactly how much of a showing Sunstein would require the section 1983 defendant to make. In any event,
Sunstein discusses a number of statutory "contexts" in which "the section
1983 remedy and a particular regulatory scheme might be found
incompatible."' 94 These contexts, in descending order of significance, are
as follows:
(1) "statutes that create independent private causes of action against state
officials"; 95
(2) "statutes involving open-ended substantive standards";'96
(3) "statutes that demand consistency and coordination in
enforcement";'
(4) "statutes in which there is evidence of8 legislative calibration of sanction to the expected enforcement level";"1
(5)"statutes in which remedies have been created against the federal
government to compel state conformity with federal law";'9
(6) "statutes in which informal methods of enforcement were intended
as the exclusive route"; 20
(7) "statutes protecting collective interests." 2 '
Sunstein certainly succeeds in giving judges a far more expansive menu
from which to choose than do those commentators who limit the inquiry
to legislative history, clear statements, or other indications of intent. There
are, however, serious problems with the approach he advocates. It is highly
likely that any attempt by the courts to follow the Sunstein approach would
lead to contradictory and highly divergent results. One reason for this predic-

191.
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tion is the vagueness and tentativeness with which Sunstein puts forward
his own criteria. 2 In developing five of the seven contexts, he states that
legislative history may be an important element in analyzing the context, 03
even though the entire approach is predicated on the fact that any such history
is highly unlikely to be found. For example, in discussing the second
context-" statutes involving open-ended substantive standards"-Sunstein
states:
[T]o resolve the preemption issue, the legislative history may often be useful.
If the history shows an intent to entrust regulatory decisions to a specialized
or technically sophisticated body, private enforcement in the federal courts
should not be permitted. If, on the other hand, there is no evidence of
such a congressional concern, the fact that the statutory standard is vague
or ambiguous may not by itself be sufficient to show preemption." '
This seems to be a somewhat roundabout way of saying that the context
approach may or may not be helpful. This pattern of qualifying the relevance
of any particular context is, however, repeated throughout Sunstein's
analysis."0
Courts would almost certainly disagree over when the various contexts are
present. A good example is the fifth context- "statutes in which remedies
have been created against the federal government to compel state conformity with federal law." As an example of such a statute, Sunstein cites with
approval the district court decision in Garrity v. Gallen."° At issue in Garrity
was the plaintiff's ability to enforce the provisions of the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act against state officials. In a
noteworthy opinion, the district court found an implied private right of action against the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 0 7 This conclusion
is a departure from traditional private rights analysis, which focuses on the
plaintiff's ability to sue the nonfederal defendants for improper administra20
tion of a federal statute. In cases such as Cannon v. University of Chicago, 8
the courts have stressed that the plaintiff must have an individualized remedy
against the grantee in order to secure any benefit from winning the lawsuit.
In this respect, the Garrity decision seems something of an aberration.
Moreover, the act in question certainly does not seem to fit within the
category of "statutes in which remedies have been created against the federal
government."
With respect to his first context-"statutes that create independent private
202. In fairness, it should be noted that Professor Sunstein limits his goal to providing a
general approach. Id. at 426 n.117.
203. Id. at 427-36.
204. Id. at 430.
205. Id. at 432, 434, 435, and 436.
206. 522 F. Supp. 171 (D.N.H. 1981).
207. Id. at 201-02.
208. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). Cannon involved alleged sex-based discrimination against the plaintiff
by a university receiving federal funds. The Court reasoned that an across-the-board cutoff
of federal funds might not benefit the plaintiff, who sought admission to the school. The Court,
therefore, allowed her to sue the university directly for approximate relief.
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causes of action against state officials"-Sunstein also expresses agreement
with the notion that finding an implied private cause of action would preempt
section 1983.2"9 The only case he cites is Garrity, which is hardly on point
because the implied right that the Garrity court found was against federal
officials. As discussed earlier, there are numerous cases that reach such a
result, but they seem inconsistent with the very notion of private enforcement under section 1983 as interpreted in Thiboutot.10 Because section 1983
plaintiffs benefit from the presumption, one would think that it would come
first and that the implied right becomes superfluous. The notion that implication of a right not expressly found in a statute can somehow preclude
the express right provided by section 1983 runs counter to the spirit of
Thiboutot to such an extent that it may be a tacit admission that the case
simply was wrong. For present purposes, it is important to note that the
concept of "statutes that create independent private causes of action against
state officials" is open to widely diverging interpretations.
Indeed, the Sunstein approach invites courts to engage in a relatively
freewheeling, common-law approach to private enforcement of federal law
of the very sort that the Supreme Court has essentially rejected in the context of implied rights. Yet Sunstein purports to oppose "an unstructured
judicial inquiry into the value of a section 1983 remedy." 2 ' Furthermore,
he argues that there is absolutely no question of judicial authority in this
area because the problem of authority disappears given the existence of section 1983.212 In effect, he reads this portion of section 1983 as if it said
"and laws except those with whose remedial scheme enforcement under this
section might be found incompatible." It does appear to be a bit attenuated
to suggest that the 1874 Congress conferred any such blanket authorization
for the federal courts to roam within the statutory framework of the 1980's.
In any event, even if Sunstein is right, his reconstruction of the statute is
one more bit of evidence that section 1983 really does not mean what it
says after all.
Another commentator, building on the Bivens doctrine," 3 has recommended
an alternative inquiry, modifying the comprehensiveness test applied in Sea
Clammers by focusing on "the statute's effectiveness in vindicating the rights
of the individual plaintiffs."" Although the commentator does not appear
willing to set himself entirely adrift from congressional intent,2 " his pro209. Sunstein, supra note 26, at 428.
210. See supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
211. Sunstein, supra note 26, at 439. Such an inquiry, according to Sunstein, "would reintroduce the vices of freewheeling judicial implication of private rights of action." Id.
212. Id. at 415.
213. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that petitioner's complaint alleging illegal search by federal narcotics agents states cause of action under
fourth amendment, for which damages are recoverable upon proof of injuries resulting from
its violation).
214. Note, Preclusion of Section 1983, supra note 26, at 1200.
215. See id. at 1199, 1200. But see id. at 1202 (focus should be on statutory terms, rather
than on legislative history, to determine rights granted by statute).
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posed approach has the advantage, like Professor Sunstein's, of moving the
inquiry away from the fruitless search for rare or nonexistent evidence of
any such intent. There may be, however, a doctrinal problem in drawing
a close analogy between section 1983 and Bivens. In Davis v. Passman,2 6
Justice Brennan sharply rebuked the lower court for applying principles of
statutory construction to the development of Bivens remedies." 7
Far more serious is the question of the workability of any test based on
the adequacy of remedies provided for in the underlying statute. The author
calls for "a sensitive inquiry into the nature of the remedy accorded." ' 8
The outcomes of such inquiries surely wotld vary widely. For example, the
commentator treats Sea Clammers as correctly decided, because independent
private enforcement under section 1983 would have allowed circumvention
of the procedures governing the citizens suit provisions available to the
plaintiffs." 9 Yet, if the focus is truly on the vindication of rights, a strong
argument can be made that the unavailability of damages in citizens suits
demands the availabiity of section 1983. Thus the "effectiveness" test turns
out not to be very effective at all. Perhaps it is just another foredoomed
attempt to discern legislative intent.
In sum, with the exception of Professor Sunstein's analysis, the result of
most of the approaches discussed in this Section would be to nullify the
affect of Pennhurst and Sea Clammers and substitute something very similar
to Justice Stevens's dissent in the latter case. What is involved, then, is not
harmonization of the three cases but rather an evisceration of the latter two.
On the other hand, Professor Sunstein does strive for a middle ground that
would put realistic limitations on Thiboutot, clearly the intent of the majority in the successor cases. His approach, however, presents such serious
problems of its own that there may be substantial reasons for not adopting
it. Perhaps the lesson to be derived from studying the proffered approaches
is that the three cases simply cannot live in harmony, and that all efforts
based on the assumption that Thiboutot was correctly decided are doomed
to failure, at least if they give anything more than lip service to the decisions in Pennhurst and Sea Clammers. This being the case, it might be useful
to consider developing approaches to the problem based on the premise that
Thiboutot was wrongly decided.
V.

A.

IF THiBOUTOT WAS WRONG

Merging Section 1983 and Implied Rights Analysis

As noted, a number of lower courts, perhaps out of resistance to the broad
implications of Thiboutot, have read Pennhurst and Sea Clammers as essen216. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).

217. Id.at 242.
218. Note, Preclusion of Section 1983, supra note 26, at 1200.
219. Id.
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tially merging the section 1983 and implied right inquiries.220 An initial question is whether such a restrictive reading of Supreme Court. precedent is a
proper activity for the lower federal courts. The answer would appear to
be yes, given the obvious intent of the majority in the two later cases to
cut back on the Thiboutot holding and the strong suggestion that the two
inquiries were similar. Just last term, Justice Powell gave further impetus
to the merger argument. In a concurring opinion in GuardiansAssociation
v. Civil Service Commission,22 ' he said with respect to private enforcement
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that "Congress' creation of an
express administrative procedure for remedying violations strongly suggests
that it did not intend that Title VI rights be enforced privately either under
the statute itself or under section 1983. ' '222 There is, however, a nagging
uncertainty given Justice Powell's phrasing of the issue in terms of an affirmative showing of congressional intent. This leaves open the question of what
a court should do if it concludes that Congress simply failed to address the
issue. The Supreme Court has not given clear guidance, even in the field
of implied rights of action itself. At times, the Court has stated that its
reason for denying a private right of action is that Congress did not intend
states that there is simply
Court
such enforcement,22 3 and at other times the 22
4
no indication that Congress did so intend.
The more important question is whether the two inquiries should be similar.
It is plausible that in each case, a court considers how private enforcement
fits with the overall scheme and purpose of the underlying statute.22 ' It might
be objected that the Supreme Court has made implied right analysis a very
difficult task by focusing on legislative intent generally and as evinced in
remedial schemes particularly. This objection is really a shorthand way of
saying that merging the two inquiries deprives Thiboutot of much of its force.
If, however, Thiboutot was wrongly decided, section 1983 should not be
permitted to serve as an end run around difficult issues of statutory construction. If the real battleground is implied rights, the issues ought to be
debated there.
The merger approach is quite close to overruling Thiboutot sub silentio.
Perhaps it can be justified as making the best of a bad job, a task necessitated
by the decision itself. This approach does, for example, leave intact the ability
of the welfare plaintiffs to sue, even if it is not entirely clear whether their
cause of action is implied from the underlying statute or furnished by sec220. See supra notes 123-37 and accompanying text.
221. 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983).
222. Id. at 3236 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring).
223. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639-40 (1981).
224. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77 (1981).
225. For example, in the context of determining the availability of implied rights of action,
Professor Sunstein has advocated criteria somewhat similar to his contexts for determining the
availability of § 1983. See Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programsand Private Rights, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 1195, 1321 (1982).
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tion 1983 through interpretations that may or may not have been correct
but are now accepted by virtue of their long standing.226
Nonetheless, there are serious problems with the merger approach. The
first, discussed above,227 is the argument that the two inquiries are fundamentally different given the potential breadth of implied rights of action as opposed to the specific focus of section 1983 on a particular class of
defendants-state and local officials. Indeed, it has been contended that section 1983 should serve as an analogue at the state and local level to the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) at the federal level. 228 The serious
federalism objections to such arguments already have been noted.229
Moreover, the APA analogy is manifestly false. At the federal level, the
political branches would serve as the only check over the administrative agencies, absent judicial review. In the context of federal grant programs, however,
the grantor agency is itself an entity, one of whose principal functions is
to oversee the operations of the state and local grantees. Thus, the need
for an across-the-board subnational analogue to the APA is far from obvious.
Somewhat more serious is the question of what a court is to do with the
section 1983 claim when it concludes that a private right of action should
be implied from the underlying statute. Excluding section 1983 in such a
case seems to run counter to the preferred status of an express cause of
action. 30 But if section 1983 is used concurrently, damages and attorney's
fees may be assessed as additional burdens on the grantee defendant, substantially altering the rules of the game. Again, the inherent weakness of the
Thiboutot construction makes a satisfactory answer impossible.
Perhaps the major problem with the merger approach is that it comes
close to reading "and laws" out of the statute. Even if Thiboutot was wrongly
decided, the language in the statute must mean something, unless one is
prepared to adopt Professor Guido Calabresi's doctrine of judicial altera23
tion of obsolete statutes. '
B.

Justice Powell's Thiboutot Dissent Revisited

We come, in part by a process of elimination, to Justice Powell's dissent
in Thiboutot itself. He argued that the reference to "and laws" in section
1983 is nothing more "than a shorthand reference to equal rights legislation
226. Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Store, 421 U.S. 723, 754 (1975) (noting longstanding judicial acceptance of a particular construction of the Securities Act of 1934 as well
as Congress's failure to reject it).
227. See supra notes 162-70 and accompanying text.
228. See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 394-95, 432-33.
229. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
231. See G. CALABSi,

A COMMON LAW

OR

THE AGE OF STATUTES

(1982). Professor Calabresi

argues that courts should play an active role in nullifying or altering statutes that are obsolete
or no longer in harmony with prevailing legal concepts. For a critique of Calabresi's thesis,
see Estreicher, JudicialNullification: Guido Calabresi'sUncommon Common Law for a Statutory
Age, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1126 (1982).
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'
enacted by Congress." 232
It is important not to lose sight of the fact that
Justice Powell's postion has substantial merits of its own, totally apart from
the serious problems of any competing approaches. His reading makes the
phrase "and laws" mean something. A presumption in favor of civil rights
plaintiffs is entirely faithful to the intent of the 1874 Congress. Of course,
the lower courts could not render any such reinterpretation of Thiboutot.
It could come, absent congressional action, only from the Supreme Court
itself.233
Even if Justice Powell's interpretation is accepted as the way out of the
Thiboutot thicket, two serious problems remain. The first problem is determining what will rebut the section 1983 presumption. There may be some
statutes with regard to which private enforcement of civil rights provisions
under section 1983 would run counter to the intent of Congress. 3 " In the
specific contexts of civil rights there is nothing wrong with putting a heavier
burden on defendants, given the intent and focus of the Congress which
enacted section 1983. Thus, one might accept a generalized approach such
as that formulated by Justice White in Pennhurst: the presumption prevails
"unless there is clear indication in a particular statute that its remedial provisions are exclusive or that for various other reasons a section 1983 action
is inconsistent with congressional intent." 33 Under such an approach the
defendant in a civil rights case will rarely prevail. In particular, under Rosado
v. Wyman, the existence of administrative remedies will not suffice to prevent enforcement under section 1983.236 Nor should the existence of some
judicial enforcement suffice, such as the provision in the 1981 block grants
for referral by the grantor agency of civil rights matters to the Attorney
General for a possible suit.237
The more serious problem which flows from an acceptance of Justice
Powell's position is the availability of damages in federal grant litigation,
because damages are explicitly available under section 1983. As we have seen,
a number of lower courts have shown a marked resistance to acceptance
of a section 1983 cause of action, precisely because such acceptance would
involve the award of damages for violation of a federal grant condition. 38

232. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 12 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
233. There is precedent for overruling the Court's prior construction of § 1983. In Monell
v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Court held that municipalities
are "persons" within the meaning of § 1983. This ruling overturned the contrary interpretation
advanced in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Monell, however, was based on a reexamination of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the predecessor of § 1983.
Any such reexamination will be of little assistance in the Thiboutot context.
234. See Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 162-69 (1970).
235. Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 51-52 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 672 (1979) (White,
., concurring)).
236. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 405-07 (1970).
237. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 300w-7 (West 1982) (Preventive Health and Health Services
Block Grant).
238. See supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.

DEPA UL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 33:31

These decisions are part of a larger body of cases considering the issue of
the availability of damages for violations of federal grant conditions, apart
from whether or not section 1983 is involved. The overwhelming majority
of federal courts have ruled that damages are an inappropriate remedy in
the grant context.23 9 Yet how does one get around the problem that section
1983 seems to mean what it says without any possible limiting construction?
The Supreme Court may be in the process of fashioning a way out of this
dilemma by developing a doctrine that damages are not in fact available
for violations of a federal grant statute. Justice Rehnquist hinted at such
an approach in the advisory portion of his Pennhurst opinion.24 ° Of much
greater significance is the extensive treatment of the issue, and the possible
adumbration of such a doctrine, by Justice White in the Court's opinion
in GuardiansAssociation v. Civil Service Commission24 ' decided at the end
of the 1983 term.
VI.

GRANTS AND DAMAGES:

GUIDANCE

FROM GUARDIANS

The many lower court decisions that have grappled with the propriety of
awarding damages for violations of federal grants have rested their analyses
on such grounds as the eleventh amendment, "2 a discerned intent of Congress to preclude such relief,2" 3 and a conclusion that damage awards would
be inconsistent with the policies underlying a particular program and might
deter participation. " Although a number of Supreme Court decisions have
addressed the remedial issues in grant litigation, these cases dealt only with
the availability and extent of equitable relief.24 In GuardiansAssociation
v. Civil Service Commission,2" 6 Justice White provided the first solid doctrinal footing for the proposition that damages are not available to third
parties asserting violations of federal grant conditions. The case is of particular significance because it relies heavily on the holding in Pennhurst and
transposes the Pennhurst clear statement principle from the area of rights
contained in grant statutes to that of remedies for their violation.
Guardians involved a challenge by minority police officers to the administration of certain examinations used for entry level positions, and also

239. See, e.g., Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1981); Drayden
v. Needville Indep. School Dist., 642 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1981).
240. See 451 U.S. 5, 29-30 (1981).
241. 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983).
242. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Health Sciences/The Chicago Medical School, 710
F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1983).
243. See, e.g., Ruth Anne M. v. Alvin Indep. School Dist., 532 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. Tex.
1982); see also supra note 150 and accompanying text.
244. See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232, 262 (2d Cir. 1980),
aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983).
245. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1981);
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 715-16 (1979); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S.
397, 420 (1970).
246. 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983).
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to the subsequent consequences when officers hired on the basis of these
examinations were laid off." 7 The district court ultimately concluded that
even though only some members of the class were entitled to relief under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI of the same act was
also available and provided remedies that were otherwise unavailable." 8 While
the Second Circuit agreed with the relief granted under Title VII, it
unanimously reversed the decision in the plaintiffs' favor to the extent that
it rested on Title VI. The majority concluded that Title VI should be enforced by an intent rather than an impact standard and that the lower court
was in error in believing that proof of discriminatory impact could suffice.24 9
Judge Meskill joined in the judgment on the alternative ground that the
remedies sought were essentially compensatory in nature, and that any award
resembling damages was not available in a private suit to enforce Title VI. 2 "0
The disposition of Guardians by the Supreme Court is somewhat muddled. Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens would uphold administrative regulations incorporating a disparate
impact standard."' Nevertheless, Justice White calculated that five members
of the Court agreed, on alternative grounds, that the judgment below should
be sustained. Two members of the Court (Justices White and Rehnquist)
would not grant damages relief in a Title VI action; two more members
of the Court (Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell) would not permit
any private action to enforce Title VI; and one member (Justice O'Connor)
would deny any relief absent a showing of discriminatory intent; therefore,
it followed that there were five votes to affirm the judgment." '
The Court's opinion consists of the one written by Justice White and joined
only by Justice Rehnquist. With respect to the availability of damages, Justice
White relied primarily on the analysis of spending power legislation which
the Court set forth in Pennhurst. He stressed that "the State or other grantee
weighs the benefits and burdens before accepting the funds and agreeing
to comply with the conditions attached to their receipt," and in doing so,
"the grantee will have in mind what its obligations will be." ' 3 In his view,
if later additional conditions, unknown at the time of the agreement, were
to be sprung on a grantee in a private suit for damages the grantee might
"terminate its receipt of federal money rather than assume the unanticipated
burdens. 254 Justice White also drew to some extent on the earlier decision
in Rosado v. Wyman, 55 which held that in an injunctive proceeding, the
grantee must be given an either-or choice of complying with the conditions
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id.
466
633
Id.
103
Id.
Id.
Id.
397

at 3223-25.
F. Supp. 1273, 1280-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
F.2d 232, 270, 272 (2d Cir. 1980).
at 254-63.
S. Ct. at 3235 n.27.
at 3229.
(emphasis added).
U.S. 397, 420 (1970).
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or opting out of the program. Taken together, Rosado and Pennhurst
established what Justice White labeled the "Pennhurst presumption" 25 6-"remedies to enforce spending power statutes must respect the
privilege of the recipient of federal funds to withdraw and terminate its receipt
of federal money rather than assume the further obligations and duties that
a court has declared are necessary for compliance." ' 2"7 Justice White also
relied on general notions of grant policy, particularly the notion that damages
awards might dissuade potential participants, 258 but he left open the issue
of intentional violations.
Justice White's analysis of the remedial issues in a suit to enforce Title
VI provoked vigorous dissents from Justices Marshall and Stevens. Justice
Marshall began by invoking the well-settled principle established by Bell v.
Hood"9 that when legal rights have been invaded "federal courts may use
any available remedy to make good the wrong done.""26 He also disagreed
with Justice White on the bearing of grant policy on the issue, arguing that
private retrospective relief is a necessary supplement to the administrative
26
cutoff remedy, the latter being so draconian that it will be rarely used. '
Perhaps most important is his direct challenge to Justice White on the bearing of Pennhurst on the matter. He first noted that any discussion in Pennhurst of remedies was purely dicta and did not address the issue of retrospective relief.2 62 He then argued that even if Pennhurst is applicable, it cuts
the other way since the grantee knew its obligations under Title VI.2 61 Drawing
directly on Pennhurst, Justice Marshall offered the following alternative to
Justice White's formulation: "Having benefitted from federal financial
assistance conditioned on an obligation not to discriminate, recipients of
federal aid must be held to their part of the bargain. ''264
Justice Stevens's dissent echoed a number of the themes stressed by Justice
Marshall. He characterized Justice White's analysis as a serious distortion
of the Pennhurst opinion "which concerned the existence or non-existence
of statutory rights, not remedies. 2 65 The main thrust of Justice Stevens's
argument is that this was a classic case for the application of Thiboutot.
The plaintiffs had sought relief under section 1983 and "our past decisions
.. .establish that section 1983 provides a damages remedy. 2 66 The issue
of damages in a case such as Guardians had been squarely resolved by
Thiboutot; thus, for Justice Stevens, policy arguments are now irrelevant
and should be addressed to Congress rather than to the Court.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

103 S. Ct. at 3231.
Id. at 3229.
Id. at 3232.
327 U.S. 678 (1946).
Guardians, 103 S. Ct. at 3244 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Bell, 327 U.S. at 684).
Id. at 3245 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3246 n.21 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3247-49 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3248 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3250 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3251 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The fact that Justice White would take the position he did in Guardians
is not without irony. He dissented vigorously in Pennhurst on the merits,
expressed doubt as to the clear statement rationale itself,267 and argued that
section 1983 was directly applicable, given the holding in Thiboutot." Indeed, he joined in the Thiboutot majority and had vigorously advocated
the rule of that case in the antecedent decision of Chapman v. Houston
Welfare Rights Organization.2 69 Yet in Guardians he dismisses, in a footnote, the argument that the availability of section 1983 could make any difference with respect to remedies, 7 ' and seems to regard the entire issue as
one to be governed primarily by judicially formulated rules rather than the
plain meaning of any particular statute. 27 '
The central question which Guardiansraises is whether its apparent holding
that damages are not available, at least for unintentional violations of federal
grant programs, will become settled law, even in those instances of intentional violations. At the moment, the issue of damages must be viewed as
'
Only two members of the Court addressed it at all.
an open question. 72
Moreover, the obvious conflict with Thiboutot's concept of plain meaning
is hard to ignore, as Justice Stevens pointed out. Some pre-Guardianscommentators have taken it as a given that after Thiboutot, damages are available
27

in the grant context. 1

The White opinion in Guardians suggests several grounds for a generalized non-damages rule, absent the rare case in which congressional intent
as to the matter is discernible. 74 The most obvious class of cases in which
damages are not available is those governed by the eleventh amendment.27 '
It is true that there are some problems in applying eleventh amendment principles, such as identifying whether the defendant is in fact classifiable as
part of "the state," '76 and whether the particular relief sought can accurately
be characterized as damages.17 7 The most obvious limitation on the eleventh

267. Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 37-42 (1981) (White,

J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 51-53 (White, J., dissenting).
269. 441 U.S. 600, 646-72 (1979) (White, J., concurring).

270. 103 S.Ct. at 3232 n.23.
271. Id. at 3229.
272. In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, decided on February 28, 1984, the Supreme
Court held that a plaintiff who alleges intentional employment discrimination may bring an

equitable action for back pay under § 504. The Court, however, did not determine "the extent
to which money damages are available under § 504." Consolidated Rail, 52 U.S.L.W. 4301,
4303 (1984).

273. See Note, Preclusion of Section 1983, supra note 26; see also The Supreme Court, 1979
Term, supra note 2.
274. Justice White admitted that he was dealing with an area in which the general rule would

favor the availability of damages. Thus, the nondamages approach is characterized as an exception. 103 S.Ct. at 3228. Nonetheless, it may well become a general principle in its own right.
275. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
276. See Cannon v. University of Health Sciences/The Chicago Medical School, 710 F.2d

351, 356-57 (7th Cir. 1983).
277. 103 S.Ct. at 3233-34.
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amendment's applicability to the issue is that the overwhelming number of
cases are likely to arise against substate units, such as county and local
governments, which simply do not benefit from any eleventh amendment
immunity at all. 78
Alternatively, one might ground a non-damages rule on general principles
of what might be called grant policy. The issues of diversion of funds from
achievement of program goals and the discouragement of potential grantees
have been noted. As Professor Richard Cappalli puts it in his recent landmark study of federal grants:
Private suits must be evaluated in a larger context which accounts for the
total public effort involved. This broader view incorporates the premise
that public programs of the type receiving federal financial aid do not
achieve perfect justice. Too many years of too little funding supports that
premise. Rather, the programs distribute limited resources as a limited solution to a limited part of the problem held by a limited sector of the problem population. These programs seek rough justice-no matter what they
may purport to do in their noble statements of purpose. It is consistent
with that limited mission to call upon the federal administrator to ferret
out and remedy only the more pervasive illegalities. And, consonant with
that view, it may often be improper for courts to . . . attempt specific

justice, particularly if judicial relief includes damage awards. Whenever
a program pays damages to an individual, it is less able to afford benefits
or services to another needy individual.279
Even if grant policy arguments have the better side of the argument over
the considerations put forward by Justice Marshall in his Guardiansdissent,
there remains the serious issue of judicial authority even to entertain them.
If Thiboutot is still good law, and means what it says, then plaintiffs such
as those in Guardians are entitled to sue under section 1983 and are also
entitled to any relief which section 1983 provides-including damages.
Pennhurst may well be the strongest foundation for a non-damages rule,
as Justice White clearly intimated. It should be noted, however, that the
remedial discussion in Pennhurst itself did not rely on the basic Pennhurst
clear statement principle, enunciated in the merits portion of the opinion.2"'
The problem with basing remedial conclusions on what the grantee knew
is that a somewhat fictional inquiry is involved. Certainly the grantee knew
it was bound to observe the conditions during the entire time that it was
getting funds. Does the Pennhurst-based approach allow it to retroactively
unbind itself without giving the money back? For that matter, just how much
can the grantee be deemed to know about remedies? Justice White suggests
that it knows only that it might be sued by the federal government. 8 ' Surely
one could take the argument a step further and say that the grantee knew
about the applicability of section 1983 as interpreted in Thiboutot. Thus,
it not only knew its obligations but was aware of the remedial consequences
as well.
278. See, e.g., Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
279. R. CAPPALLI, supra note 9, at § 8:37.
280. See 451 U.S. at 27-30.

281. See 103 S. Ct. at 3232 n.24.
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At this point, a serious element of circularity creeps in. Take the issue
of implied rights of action to enforce grant statutes, for example. Since the
statute says nothing about any such private enforcement, the grantee could
possibly argue that under Pennhurst principles, implied rights are unavailable
as a general proposition.282 Alternatively, of course, one can counter that
the grantee is aware of generally applicable principles of law including that
of the doctrine of implied rights of action. Therefore, what the grantee knew
may prove too much, or too little.
Perhaps an alternative reading of Guardians is required to sustain any
non-damages principle. This reading would begin with a recognition that in
Pennhurst itself there are suggestions that Congress's power under the spend83
ing clause is limited in ways which exercises of other powers may not be.
28
Thus, the close doctrinal link with National League of Cities v. Usery '
takes on great significance. The argument might be developed along the
following lines.
Through the spending power, Congress exercises national authority in subject matter areas that may be beyond the reach of its coercive powers, or
which traditionally have been regarded as state and local functions.285 Grant
conditions can impair the independence and sovereignty of state and local
' 286
governments, especially if they impose "massive financial obligations
which limit the ability of state and local governments to direct their own
source revenue toward locally desired uses. Precluding damage awards thus
serves two goals consistent with the view of federalism enunciated in National League of Cities; it prevents grant conditions from becoming the
and it minimizes the risk of large
equivalent of binding federal norms287
28 8
drains on state and local treasuries.
If accepted, this logic would appear applicable to intentional violations
of grant conditions as well as unintentional violations, an issue left open
282. See R.

CAPPALLI,

supra note 9, at § 8:40.

283. 451 U.S. at 17 n.13.
284. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
285. See generally Susskind, Revenue Sharing and the Lessons of the New Federalism, 8
URB. L. ANN. 33, 42-51 (1974).
286. Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
287. If damages were available, congressional exercises of the spending power would thus
be the basis for a federally created body of tort law. It is not necessarily the case, however,
that grant conditions are enacted only under the spending power. Some forms of discrimination by state and local grantees would be subject to congressional action under the fourteenth
amendment. Development of the Pennhurst presumption will require a principled approach to
the question of what power or powers Congress has utilized in enacting a particular program.
In Pennhurst, Justice Rehnquist suggested the additional presumption that grant programs are
enacted pursuant to the spending power unless Congress states otherwise. See id. at 16-17.
In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), however, Chief Justice Burger stated that Congress had exercised "an amalgam of its specifically delegated powers" in attaching a minority
set-aside condition to a public works grant program. Id. at 473. 1
288. The Court has intimated concern over such risks in other contexts. See, e.g., Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (Court should not "second-guess state officials charged
with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among the myriad
of potential recipients").
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in Guardians. Pennhurst consequently may become one of the major
federalism precedents of the Burger Court. What Justice Rehnquist was really
saying is not that spending power issues are different because of what the
grantee might or might not expect, but because exercises of the spending
power must be tightly scrutinized and circumscribed to prevent it from
swallowing up the independence of the subnational units. A rule against
awarding damages for breach of grant conditions is a logical outcome of
this approach.
The analysis offered above goes far beyond what Justice White said in
Guardians. Perhaps it can be viewed as one example of the adumbration
by the Supreme Court of principles of grant law. 2" 9 It is consistent, moreover,
with arguments against broad recourse to the spending powers that have
been voiced since the beginning of the republic. 29 ° Yet it is less of a denial
of national authority than the argument advanced vigorously by state and
local governments after National League of Cities that grant conditions could
themselves violate principles of state sovereignty by being overly intrusive.
proponents of federalism, the courts have rejected
To the dismay of many
29
all such contentions. '
The non-damages rule appears as a middle ground. It keeps alive the notion that National League of Cities does impose some limits on uses of the
spending power.292 It can be seen, in terms of grant policy, as a good attempt at balancing-preserving some form of private relief, while avoiding
the unpredictability and potentially serious consequences of damages. One
cannot refrain from noting also that it is yet another proof that section 1983,
Thiboutot notwithstanding, does not mean what it says.
It is clear that the law with respect to this issue is in a state of development and will take a good deal of time to sort itself out. For example, despite
the analysis advanced above, Justice White might agree with an award of
damages in a case of intentional violations of grant conditions. Nevertheless,
it is not clear where his analysis would go if the conditions involved matters
other than discrimination. This uncertainty is one more example of the legacy
of Thiboutot: an extensive period during which the courts thrash around
and reach inconsistent results, with no clear guide given the status of precedent. The question arises, perhaps inevitably, whether Congress should step in.

289. For a discussion of the concept of grant law as a separate field, see Brown, Federalism
from the "Grant Law" Perspective, 15 URB. LAW. IX (1983). Whatever the status of grant
law as a field, it is clear that the damages holding in Guardiansis a development of potentially
great doctrinal and practical significance. The Harvard Law Review, however, apparently
disagrees. A recent commentary on Guardians devotes only one paragraph to the damages component. Note, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 70, 245-46 (1983).
290. See R. CAPPALLI, supra note 9, at § 10:01.
291. See id. at § 10:13. See generally Kaden, Politics, Money and State Sovereignty: The
Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847 (1979).
292. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 179-81 (2d
ed. 1983).
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VII.

SHOULD CONGRESS

STEP IN?

Given the current state of affairs, Congress might find it desirable to clarify
the area. One option would be a statute such as that proposed by Senator
Orrin Hatch in 1981, inserting in lieu of "and laws" in section 1983 the
following: "and by any law providing for equal rights of citizens or of all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States." 2 93 Any such legislation
is liable to encounter immediate opposition on the ground that it is a serious
restriction of federal rights. Indeed, Senator Hatch found this out when he
held hearings on his own proposal.29
There is perhaps a more serious political objection to attempting to push
any such corrective legislation. There are a number of section 1983-related
issues about which people on both sides of the spectrum feel strongly.
Restricting a bill to only one issue, the overturning of Thiboutot, would
be highly unlikely. On one side, there are those who might wish to overturn
Supreme Court precedents on such issues as municipal liability"' and exhaustion of remedies.2 96 The issue of attorney's fees under section 1983 also
has excited considerable interest.2 97 On the other side, there are many strong
defenders of section 1983 who feel that its scope has been seriously cut back,
primarily through the Younger doctrine and its extensions. As they did during the 1970's-via a bill numbered S. 1983-members of Congress who take
this view would be certain to attempt to address the issues of importance
to them.298 Although one author has suggested some possibility of
compromise,299 it seems more likely that precisely the opposite would occur.
Thus, the fate of corrective legislation would be dubious at best.
Moreover, there is the question of whether a single bill could deal adequately with all the issues raised by Thiboutot and its progeny. One issue
is that of unintended consequences. Although it appears that those who
favored Senator Hatch's bill did not wish to overturn the cases permitting
welfare plaintiffs to sue, 3"' any amendment which limited section 1983 to
equal rights might have such a consequence. Presumably, legislative history
adequately constructed could cure the problem, but it certainly would need

293. S. 584, 97th Cong.,

1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in Municipal Liability Hearings, supra

note 11, at 3.
294. See, e.g., id. at 44-48 (statement of Steven H. Steinglass).
295. See id. at 1-2 (opening statement of Senator Orrin Hatch).
296. See, e.g., S. 3018, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., Part D (1982) (imposing general exhaustion

requirement).
297. Municipal Liability Hearings, supra note 11, at 98-103 (statement on behalf of the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers).
298. See, e.g., Howard, The States and the Supreme Court, 31 CATH. U.L. REV. 375, 382-83
(1982).
299. Sagazi-Nejad, Proposed Amendments to Section 1983 Introduced in the Senate, 27 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 373, 403-05 (1983).
300. See Municipal Liability Hearings, supra note I1, at 24-25 (statement of Professor Charles
Abernathy).
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to be addressed. There is also the issue of damages discussed in Section VI.
The courts appear to have embarked on an interesting and promising doctrinal path in the Guardianscase. A reenactment of section 1983 in its present form, including the availability of damages, would either end the development of post-Guardians law, or perhaps produce a confrontation as to
whether such a statute encounters constitutional difficulties in the context
of grant cases. At the moment, the "Pennhurst" presumption," as elaborated
in Guardians,avoids the necessity of facing any such constitutional questions.
Finally, the question arises whether there remains any need for Congress
to step in,at least in an across-the-board fashion. Senator Hatch's bill appears to have been prompted by concerns, similar to those stated by Justice
Powell in his Thiboutot dissent, that the expanded reading of section 1983
would have a sudden, widespread impact. Clearly, Pennhurst and Sea Clammers have blunted a substantial amount of this impact. In fact, this point
was made in 1981 by witnesses before Senator Hatch's Subcommittee.3" '
Nonetheless, it must be remembered that what the Supreme Court has done
is to substitute one set of problems for another. Instead of an overly expansive, and potentially harmful, construction of section 1983, what we now
have is rampant uncertainty as to when it is available for federal statutory
claimants and what remedies are triggered when it is available. The courts
are grappling with these issues, but it obviously will take them a long time
to resolve them. Definitive resolution can, and should, come from Congress.
The resolution, however, should not be attempted in any single piece of
legislation. Rather, the individual Committees which consider the reauthorization or other amendment of federal grant programs should direct their attention to the entire issue of private enforcement of grant conditions, rather
than leave it in limbo as has been the practice in the past. If Congress undertakes this task seriously, Thiboutot may prove to have been a useful catalyst.
If not, given the obvious weaknesses of the decision, we are condemned
to a long. period of uncertainty and inconsistent results.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Perhaps the lesson of Thiboutot is that bad decisions make hard law. After
Pennhurst and Sea Clammers imposed limitations on the broad sweep of
Thiboutot, the courts and litigants have faced the impossible task of discerning what those limitations are and how to work with them. In addition,
the issue of the availability of damages is surfacing as a major question,
given the recent opinion in Guardians. Defenders of Thiboutot can argue
persuasively that the words "and laws" have to mean something. The problem is that the Supreme Court's decision to apply, in a cursory fashion,
a plain meaning approach to an exceedingly complex area was doomed from
the start, as Justice Powell predicted. The honest thing to do is to admit
the mistake and start over. Commentators, in particular, might follow the
High Court's lead and attempt to give Thiboutot a decent burial, rather
than attempt to breathe new life into an unworkable doctrine.
301. See, e.g., id. at 404-05 (statement of Professor Leon Friedman).

